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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the potential for a specific type of accidental nuclear conflict 
between India and Pakistan. Known as inadvertent war, such a conflict would be the 
result of a mistaken attempt at preemption, the launching of a nuclear attack by one 
nation in the mistaken belief that the other was doing likewise or was about to do so. 
While nuclear weapons can ordinarily be expected to exert a sobering influence on 
decision-makers, an escalating spiral of military activity during a crisis may generate 
different situational imperatives. Inadvertent war becomes possible when decision- 
makers perceive that conflict is inevitable and that there is a significant advantage in 
striking first. 
Evidence suggests that there is good reason for concern about the threat of 
inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. The nuclear force structures adopted by India and 
Pakistan can be expected to exert a particularly strong influence on the potential for both 
of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war. The current arsenals of these countries, 
small and heavily dependant upon aircraft for weapons delivery, may invite preemption 
in the event that nuclear war appears imminent. If India and Pakistan increase their 
nuclear delivery capabilities by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the potential 
for inadvertent war will be even greater. In the context of a military confrontation in 
South Asia, ballistic missiles are likely to contribute both to perceptions of first-strike 
advantage and to reinforcing military alerts that can lead to the belief that nuclear war is 
inevitable. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Among the dangers associated with the development of India and Pakistan's 
nuclear capabilities is the possibility of an accidental nuclear war involving these two 
nations. Senior U.S. officials have expressed serious concern regarding the threat of an 
accidental nuclear conflict during recent Indo-Pakistani crises. Given the enormous 
destructive power of nuclear weapons and the urban density of human population in 
South Asia, the consequences of such a war would be horrific. 
This thesis assesses the potential for a specific type of accidental nuclear conflict 
between India and Pakistan. Known as inadvertent war, such a conflict would be the 
result of a mistaken attempt at preemption, the launching of a nuclear attack by one 
nation in the mistaken belief that the other was doing likewise or was about to do so. 
While nuclear weapons can ordinarily be expected to exert a sobering influence on 
decision-makers, an escalating spiral of military activity during a crisis may generate 
different situational imperatives. Inadvertent war becomes possible when decision- 
makers perceive that conflict is inevitable and that there is a significant advantage in 
striking first. 
Evidence suggests that there is good reason for concern about the threat of 
inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. The nuclear force structures adopted by India and 
Pakistan can be expected to exert a particularly strong influence on the potential for both 
of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war. The current arsenals of these countries, 
small and heavily dependant upon aircraft for weapons delivery, may invite preemption 
xv 
in the event that nuclear war appears imminent. If India and Pakistan increase their 
nuclear delivery capabilities by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the potential 
for inadvertent war will be even greater. In the context of a military confrontation in 
South Asia, ballistic missiles are likely to contribute both to perceptions of first-strike 
advantage and to reinforcing military alerts that can lead to the belief that nuclear war is 
inevitable. 
These findings have significant implications for U.S. foreign policy. By 
improving the balance of incentives and disincentives that encourage restraint in the 
deployment of ballistic missiles, addressing security concerns that promote the growth of 
South Asian nuclear capabilities, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in 
international politics, and acting to diffuse emergent Indo-Pakistani crises in a manner 
that discourages further confrontations, the United States can at least mitigate the threat 
of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. As similar risks of inadvertent war can be 
expected in the event of nuclear proliferation to other regions of the world, these findings 
also highlight the need for redoubled efforts to strengthen the global nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. 
xvi 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
India's nuclear tests in May of 1998 drew a strong and immediate reaction from 
the United States. The Clinton administration moved swiftly to impose wide-ranging 
sanctions upon India under U.S. legislative provisions, and encouraged other major 
trading nations to respond similarly.1 The United States also attempted to dissuade 
Pakistan from responding to India's test in kind, promising significant military and 
economic aid in exchange for nuclear forbearance.2 When Pakistan detonated its own 
nuclear devices later in the month, the United States led international efforts to isolate 
both South Asian countries, contributing to strongly worded calls from both the 
permanent five (P-5) members of the United Nations Security Council and the Group of 
Eight (G-8) for Indian and Pakistani "restraint." The G-8 and nations of the European 
Union ultimately were persuaded to follow their verbal condemnation of the tests with 
more significant punitive action.3 
1
 See United States, Bureau of Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan 
Sanctions, 18 June 1998, 12 Sep. 2000 <http://wwov.state.gov/www/regions/sa/fa_980618_india_pak.html> 
and United States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the Press Secretary: 
India Sanctions," 13 May 1998, Berlin, 21 Sep. 2000 
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/sa/980513_wh_india_sanctions.html>. 
2
 Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," 
International Security 23.4 (Spring 1999): 194-95; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine 
and Command and Control," Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Weapons, eds. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
2000) 164-65. 
3
 Ahmed, 196-97 and Virginia I. Foran, "Indo-US Relations after the 1998 Tests: Sanctions Versus 
Incentives," Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy," eds. Gary K. 
Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava (New York: Routledge, 1999) 59-60. 
1 
Implicit in continuing U.S. opposition to the growth of nuclear capabilities in 
South Asia is the belief that nuclear proliferation is a dangerous phenomenon, illustrating 
the "proliferation pessimist" viewpoint that has informed U.S. foreign policy since the 
Baruch Plan of 1946.4 In the South Asian case, nuclear weapons are seen as increasing 
the dangers associated with the Indo-Pakistani rivalry that has produced three wars and 
continual low-level violence during the past five decades. Moreover, the emergence of 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals has threatened the global non-proliferation regime 
at a time when its continued survival has already been called into question by the 
discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program and by friction between the 
international community and North Korea over that country's nuclear ambitions. 
Among the variety of dangers that may be associated with the spread of nuclear 
capabilities to India and Pakistan is the possibility of an unintended or accidental nuclear 
war between these two nations. U.S. officials have implied on several occasions that a 
danger of unintended nuclear conflict exists in South Asia. In reference to the Kashmir 
crisis of 1990, a senior U.S. official reportedly stated: 
The concern was that they [India and Pakistan] were inadvertently 
lurching toward a conflict that neither one of them wanted... Each side 
was worst-casing the other's reactions or intentions. Each modest military 
move was looked on by the other as requiring a response by the other side. 
Also, there was a ratcheting up of military developments on both sides that 
was very worrisome.5 
4
 For a general discussion of concerns associated with nuclear proliferation, see Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995) and Peter 
R. Lavoy, et al., "The Kenneth Waltz - Scott Sagan Debate, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Good or 
Bad?," Security Studies 4.4 (Summer 1995): 695-753. 
5
 Michael R. Gordon, "War over Kashmir is Feared by U.S.," New York Times 17 June 1990, late ed.: 
A15. 
While commander of the U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zinni expressed 
similar concerns with respect to more recent Indo-Pakistani tensions. During an interview 
on the subject of South Asian nuclear developments, he noted that the 1999 Kargil crisis 
"scared both sides...it escalated with mobilizations on different fronts - tit for tat. Both 
sides are now very concerned about how escalation works and how it could happen very 
quickly."6 
For all the weight that fears of unintended nuclear war are given in some accounts 
of Indo-Pakistani crises, there is considerable debate among scholars as to whether such 
concerns are justified. Some analysts ask why the logic of deterrence, by which fears of 
devastating retribution promote caution in relations between nuclear-armed states, should 
not serve new nuclear nations as well as it seems to have served the superpowers during 
the Cold War. They point out that many of the dangers purportedly associated with the 
spread of nuclear weapons depend upon broad characterizations of new nuclear states as 
radical, unstable, irrational, or even "undeterrable."7 Historical evidence, they argue, 
gives reason to be optimistic about the resiliency of deterrence in the context of regional 
crises. As India and Pakistan have weathered periods of tension and even conflict without 
disaster since acquiring nuclear capabilities, these scholars find support for assertions that 
a nuclear war in South Asia is very unlikely.8 
6
 Robert Windrem and Tammy Kupperman, "Pakistan Nukes Outstrip India's, Officials Say: U.S. 
Reverses Assessment of South Asia Nuclear Balance," MSNBC News 4 Sep. 2000, 4 Sep. 2000 
<http://www.msnbc.eom/news/417106.asp>. 
7
 Sagan and Waltz 10-13. 
8
 Devin T. Hagerty argues this point in The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from 
South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) and "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani 
Crisis," International Security 20.3 (Winter 1995/96): 79-114. His assertions, though made before the 1998 
nuclear tests and 1999 Kargil crisis, are highly relevant to the issues under consideration here and will be 
addressed in some detail in Chapter II. 
B.        PURPOSE OF THESIS 
Is there a significant danger of unintended nuclear war between India and 
Pakistan? Might the risk of such a conflict increase in the future? What can be done to 
eliminate or at least mitigate this danger? With the fate of millions of lives potentially in 
the balance, the imperative of finding answers to these questions is clear. Equally clear is 
that the analysis supporting such answers must avoid unsubstantiated characterizations of 
South Asian nuclear dynamics or decision making as different from those that obtain 
elsewhere, especially among the five nuclear weapon states (NWS).9 Such arguments not 
only have failed to impress Western theorists, but also are likely to be rejected as 
ethnocentric and hypocritical by those individuals who are best positioned to effect 
changes in South Asia, the government officials and security analysts who shape nuclear 
policy in India and Pakistan.10 
C.        ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
This thesis employs crisis instability theory as developed by Robert Jervis and 
other scholars to assess whether a particular type of unintended nuclear conflict known as 
inadvertent war is possible in South Asia. An inadvertent war would begin when one 
nation chose to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against another in the mistaken belief 
that the latter had launched or was about to launch a nuclear strike of its own. Insofar as 
the nation launching the preemptive nuclear attack in this scenario would do so 
deliberately, inadvertent nuclear war would not be unintentional in the strictest sense of 
the word. Such a war would be an accidental and undesired conflict nonetheless, as it 
9
 Here and throughout this paper, the term "nuclear weapon states" refers to the five nations accorded 
such status under Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the People's Republic of China. 
10
 Hagerty, Consequences 10; Sagan and Waltz 13. 
4 
would not occur if the nation striking first accurately understood the intentions of the 
other. 
Crisis instability theory describes two necessary conditions that together may be 
sufficient to cause inadvertent nuclear war. Since this theory employs a rational actor 
model of nuclear decision-making, it should be as applicable for assessing the likelihood 
of inadvertent war in South Asia as it is valid for analyzing nuclear dynamics elsewhere 
in the world.11 By avoiding the theoretical pitfalls of arguments that characterize 
developing nations as different from the existing NWS, an analysis based on crisis 
instability theory should also be less susceptible to charges of First World-bias, and 
accordingly more persuasive to a variety of readers. Crisis instability theory will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
Inadvertent war is not the only type of unintended or accidental nuclear war that 
might occur between India and Pakistan. Nuclear war could result from the theft or 
unauthorized launch of a weapon, an electrical or mechanical malfunction that results in 
the detonation of a device, an accident involving the transport of a weapon, or any one of 
a number of other potential causes.12 The discussion of such possibilities is not entirely 
separable from that of inadvertent nuclear war - a nuclear weapons accident, for 
example, could result in the mistaken belief that an adversary had launched a nuclear 
strike. In the interest of maintaining focus, this thesis will address such eventualities only 
11
 The "rational actor" in this case is subject to the same psychological biases, incomplete information, 
and other potential sources of perceptual error that afflict actors in most well-developed models of rational 
behavior. 
12
 For comprehensive discussions of the dangers of unauthorized nuclear weapons use or accidents 
involving nuclear weapons see Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear 
Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992) and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: 
Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993). See also Charles Perrow, 
Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
as they relate directly to inadvertent war. How the theft, unauthorized use, or accidental 
detonation of nuclear weapons might be prevented in South Asia remains a worthy 
subject for further research. 
D.        ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins by addressing the theoretical arguments and historical evidence 
for the robustness of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Proliferation optimists have 
argued that nuclear weapons exert such a sobering influence on decision makers that a 
nuclear war between regional nuclear powers is very unlikely. They contend that 
historical evidence from crises involving India and Pakistan since these countries 
developed nuclear weapons provides confirmatory evidence about the resiliency of 
deterrence in South Asia. Crisis instability theory will be described in detail and used to 
critique the arguments of these scholars, demonstrating that their assumptions about the 
nature of crisis decision-making are flawed and that the history of South Asian crises 
gives less cause for comfort than they assert. 
Chapter III argues that the potential for inadvertent war in South Asia during 
future crises will be strongly influenced by the nuclear force structures adopted by India 
and Pakistan, and discusses how regional force structures (and the nuclear postures and 
employment doctrines that derive from them) might evolve during the next decade in 
order to assess the impact that specific alternatives might have upon the likelihood of 
such a conflict. The relatively short time frame that this analysis will consider is the 
product of both the particularly destabilizing effects that near-term South Asian nuclear 
force structure developments may have, and the difficulty of making predictions about 
the state of regional forces that apply to the more distant future. Evidence indicates that a 
substantial danger of inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan already exists, 
and that potential near-term enhancements to South Asian nuclear capabilities - 
especially the introduction of ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems - would 
greatly increase the danger of inadvertent war during the next ten years. 
Chapter IV offers a summary of the findings of this thesis and an assessment of 
their implications for U.S. policy. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.      THE DANGER OF INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR 
A.        NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 
1.        Arguments for the Robustness of Regional Nuclear Deterrence 
Proliferation optimists argue that the employment of nuclear weapons by new 
nuclear powers is highly unlikely, and that nuclear weapons can serve to enhance the 
security of these states. While individual optimists differ on whether their prescriptions 
are applicable to the entire world, the central tenets of their arguments are similar.13 
Kenneth N. Waltz makes a case for proliferation optimism in two essays that appear 
within The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, coauthored by Scott D. Sagan. 
Starting from the neo-realist assumption that state behavior is the product of a rational 
cost/benefit calculus, Waltz asserts that states act with great care in choosing war if the 
perceived cost of fighting is high. In a nuclear environment, the stakes are the highest 
possible. "Countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in 
defeat their suffering will be limited," he writes. "Calculations about nuclear war are 
differently made. In a nuclear world, one is concerned about surviving or being 
annihilated."14 
Waltz and other optimists argue that given the potentially enormous costs of 
fighting a nuclear war, the mere possibility of being punished with nuclear weapons 
should deter a state from threatening the vital interests of another state that possesses 
these devices, even if the first state has nuclear weapons of its own.15 Because the 
13
 Peter R. Lavoy, et al. 700-7, 716-17. 
14
 Sagan and Waltz 5-7. 
15
 Optimists acknowledge that nuclear deterrence may not prevent the outbreak of limited conflicts 
9 
damage that can be caused by even a single nuclear weapon is so great, uncertainty over 
whether the victim of an attack might respond with nuclear weapons should be enough to 
prevent major conflict.16 This faith in the value of retributive uncertainty has important 
implications for the kinds of nuclear forces that optimists believe are needed for 
deterrence. A state's possession of small nuclear forces, easily hidden and perhaps 
supplemented by decoys, should suffice to convince any adversary considering nuclear 
first-use that unacceptable levels of punishment would result from such a decision, since 
an attempt at a counterforce first strike is bound to be less than perfectly successful. 
In fact, optimists argue, the modest nuclear capabilities that regional powers will 
possess should make counterforce attacks even less of an option. As David J. Karl writes: 
The shortage of critical resources and capabilities faced by emerging 
nuclear powers are, in the abstract, a bane for crisis stability, but in 
practice they may tend to operate as blessings in disguise. While 
constraints limit arsenal size and thus in theory create inviting targets for 
offensive action, they also restrict the number of weapons available for use 
in counterforce attacks. Unless counterforce attacks are executed with 
improbable accuracy and effectiveness - all the more improbable in view 
of the rudimentary intelligence capabilities possessed by new proliferators 
- they are impossible using the sparse arsenals that emerging nuclear 
states are likely to employ against each other.17 
Optimists expect that uncertainty over the possibility of retribution will allow deterrence 
to hold even when the nuclear forces of one nation are larger or otherwise superior to 
those of the other. "Variations in number mean little within wide ranges," asserts Waltz. 
"The expected effect of the deterrent achieves an easy clarity because such wide margins 
that do not threaten the vital interests of the states involved. "War can be fought in the face of deterrent 
threats," writes Waltz, "but the higher the stakes, and the closer a country moves towards winning them, the 
more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction." Sagan and Waltz 8. 
16
 Sagan and Waltz 24-25. 
17
 David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21.3 
(Winter 1996/97): 105 
10 
of error in estimates of the damage one may suffer do not matter. Do we expect to lose 
one city or two, two cities or ten?"18 
2.        Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in South Asia 
Devin T. Hagerty, Peter Lavoy, and other analysts of Indo-Pakistani security 
dynamics have argued that evidence from a number of crises supports the optimist 
contention that nuclear war, intended or otherwise, is unlikely in South Asia.19 Although 
Indian military commanders apparently proposed preventive strikes against Pakistan's 
nascent nuclear infrastructure twice during the 1990s, prime minister Indira Gandhi ruled 
against such action on both occasions in part due to concerns that Pakistan might strike 
back against Indian nuclear facilities, causing an environmental catastrophe that could 
have endangered many lives.20 While Hagerty finds only ambiguous evidence that 
nuclear deterrence prevented war from erupting during the "Brasstacks" crisis of 1986- 
87, he nonetheless points out that the "dire predictions" of proliferation pessimists were 
not borne out in this case.21 During the 1990 Kashmir crisis, by contrast, he concludes 
that the deterrent value of India and Pakistan's rudimentary nuclear forces was likely the 
most important factor in the prevention of war, that uncertainty over the possibility of 
nuclear retaliation prevented a conflict from erupting. Both India and Pakistan were 
18SaganandWaltz8. 
19
 Lavoy lists a number of analysts who share this view, including (in addition to himself and Hagerty) 
George Perkovich, former Indian and Pakistan army chiefs of staff K. Sundarji and Aslam Beg, Pakistani 
general K. M. Arif, and Indian security analyst K. Subrahmanyam. See Lavoy, et al. 707. 
20
 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999) 239-41, 258; Sidhu, "India's Doctrine" 132-34. 
21
 Hagerty, Consequences 115-16. 
11 
deterred from initiating a war, he states, simply "by the knowledge that the other was 
nuclear weapon-capable."22 
Hagerty is able to draw his conclusions about the 1990 Kashmir crisis because of 
clear evidence that each of the antagonists had come to recognize the other's nuclear 
capabilities by this point in time, making the crisis an apparent textbook case for the 
arguments of deterrence optimists. Mutual recognition of these limited capabilities and 
the possibility of devastating retribution that flowed from them appears to have been 
sufficient to prevent the outbreak of major war, as optimists would predict. The evidence 
that each side was aware of the nuclear capabilities of the other during this crisis is 
sound. India's ability to construct nuclear weapons on short notice (if not its outright 
possession of such weapons) was widely acknowledged at this time, as it had tested a 
nuclear device some sixteen years earlier. Meanwhile, public statements by Pakistani 
officials and the U.S. government's well-publicized concern over Pakistan's nuclear 
aspirations had served to "build transparency" into that country's otherwise opaque 
nuclear program during the late 1980s, ensuring Indian awareness of Pakistan's 
capabilities.23 
With tensions running very high during the Kashmir crisis (the two sides 
deployed hundreds of thousands of additional troops to the vicinity of their common 
border) and the nuclear forces of both India and Pakistan existing in only a crude (and 
potentially vulnerable) form, pressures for nuclear preemption and war should have been 
strong. Previous crises involving Kashmir, after all, were the proximate cause of two of 
22
 Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence" 80. 
23
 Hagerty, Consequences 117-32. 
12 
the three wars that India and Pakistan had fought since gaining their independence. In 
marked contrast to events in 1947 and 1965, however, the two countries exhibited 
considerable restraint in 1990, and conflict was averted. Why? The most plausible 
explanation, argues Hagerty, is that there was "simply no way that Indian and Pakistani 
planners could have had confidence in launching an entirely successful [counterforce] 
first strike."24 Uncertainty over the possibility of nuclear retaliation, in other words, was 
sufficient to deter war under extremely volatile conditions. "Having weathered the 
Brasstacks and Kashmir crises," Hagerty adds,   "Indian and Pakistani leaders can rest 
more easily in the knowledge that as tempers flared during these war scares, neither side 
was tempted into preemptive action."25 
B.        CRISIS INSTABILITY AND INADVERTENT CONFLICT 
1. Crisis Instability Theory 
Proliferation optimists tend to be dismissive of the danger that one state will 
launch a preemptive nuclear strike against another during a crisis. Their arguments, 
however, presume that the cosfbenefit calculus for launching preemptive attacks during 
crises is identical to that for launching an aggressive or preventive nuclear war - so long 
as a state cannot guarantee with certainty that a nuclear strike will not bring a devastating 
response, the potential costs of launching an attack well outweigh any gains to be had. 
Crisis instability theory indicates that this presumption is dangerously flawed. 
Robert Jervis provides a comprehensive description of crisis instability in The 
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Quoting Thomas Schelling, he notes that this 
condition derives from "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack." He writes: 
24
 Hagerty, Consequences 165. 
25
 Hagerty, Consequences 191. 
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Since each side fears being taken by surprise, each must remain on alert, 
which means not only monitoring the other side's military activities... but 
also preparing one's forces to act. These actions, however, can lead the 
other side to conclude that the state may be about to attack. The other side 
would then move to an increased state of readiness, thus confirming the 
state's suspicion that an attack was likely... The result could be an awful 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which the actions each side takes... fuel the 
fears of the other side, producing a war neither side sought.26 
Crisis instability is dangerous because of the potential it generates for a rational decision 
to use nuclear weapons under conditions where neither side would consider doing so if in 
the possession of complete information about the other's intentions. The result would be 
an inadvertent war, a war that neither state would prefer even to a defeat in the crisis at 
hand.27 Inadvertent nuclear war would begin with a mistaken attempt at preemption, 
driven by the conviction that "as terrible as striking first would be, receiving the first 
blow would be even worse."28 
2.        Necessary Conditions for Inadvertent War 
According to Jervis, crisis instability creates a potential for inadvertent war when 
decision makers come to subscribe to a set of "twin beliefs" about the confrontation in 
which their nation is involved: 
1. The belief that total war (a nuclear exchange) is inevitable. 
2. The perception that there is a significant advantage to striking first. 
For an inadvertent war to occur between two nations, decision makers in at least one of 
the two would have to believe both that nuclear war was unavoidable and that there was 
26
 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Nuclear 
Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989) 138. 
27
 Jervis, Meaning 139. 
28
 Jervis, Meaning 134. 
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some advantage to be gained by being the first to attack.29 As the use of the words 
"belief and "perception" should indicate, the existence of the necessary conditions for 
instability during a given crisis would depend as much upon the perceptions of decision- 
makers as upon substantive realities. The relation between the conditions necessary for 
inadvertent war is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. 
Potential for Inadvertent 
Nuclear War 
Figure 1. Necessary Conditions for Inadvertent Nuclear War 
The second necessary condition for inadvertent nuclear war, perceptions that there 
is a significant advantage in striking first, depends specifically upon the existence of 
either of two sub-conditions: 
1. The perceived vulnerability of an adversary's nuclear forces. 
2. The perceived vulnerability of one's own nuclear forces. 
In the first case, preemption is advantageous because it allows a state to limit the damage 
to itself that will result from the impending strike of its enemy. In the second, preemption 
29
 Jervis, Meaning 136-37. 
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allows a state to inflict maximum damage upon its adversary before the state's ability to 
do so is disrupted, a form of advance retribution that may limit the adversary's ability to 
dominate the post-hostilities political/military environment.30 By contrast, when the 
nuclear forces of both sides involved in a crisis are largely survivable, the temptation for 
preemption is eliminated - neither side can hope to significantly reduce the damage it 
will sustain in a nuclear war by striking first, and each can be confident that its own 
forces will be able to exact retribution in the unlikely event that the other still chooses to 
launch an attack. 
3.        The Stability-Instability Paradox 
Some analysts have suggested that conditions of crisis stability, in which mutual 
fears of nuclear destruction prevent escalation, can be just as dangerous as crisis 
instability. Under such conditions a state with revisionist goals might initiate limited 
conventional operations against an adversary, confident that deterrence would prevent 
undesired escalation. In this view, a degree of crisis instability in relations between 
nuclear states is actually desirable, since the threat of inadvertent conflict serves as an 
added deterrent to would-be aggressors. Scholars describe the dilemma associated with 
choosing between the dangers of crisis stability and those of crisis instability as the 
"stability-instability paradox."31 
Both Indian officials and extra-regional analysts have indicated that Pakistan has 
recently sought to exploit perceptions of crisis stability to further its political goals in 
Kashmir. Pakistani leaders have been sufficiently confident in the robustness of nuclear 
30
 Jervis, Meaning 145. 
31
 This concept was first described by Glenn Snyder in "The Balance of Power and the Balance of 
Terror," The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). 
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deterrence to infiltrate guerillas and even regular military forces across the Line of 
Control (LOC) with little fear of Indian escalation in response.32 Such operations not 
only reap military benefits for Pakistan (by exacting high costs on the Indian military, 
increasing Pakistani experience in certain types of operations, providing opportunities for 
intelligence gathering, etc.), but also can bolster domestic support for Pakistan's political 
leaders. Moreover, by exacerbating international fears of crisis instability (even in an 
environment that Pakistan's leaders perceive as crisis stable), clashes in Kashmir draw 
global attention to the Indo-Pakistani dispute over the territory. Internationalization of the 
Kashmir dispute has been a long-standing strategic goal of Pakistan, which is at a 
disadvantage both diplomatically and militarily in the ongoing confrontation with its 
larger neighbor.33 
Crisis instability remains more dangerous than crisis stability for one reason - 
conditions of crisis stability theoretically foster only low levels of violence that do not 
immediately threaten the vital interests of the nations involved. The existence of genuine 
nuclear crisis stability in South Asia might encourage a continuation of low-level fighting 
between India and Pakistan, but would dramatically reduce the potential dangers 
associated with that fighting. By contrast, although violence would probably be less 
frequent if Indian and Pakistani decision makers feared instability in the event of crises, 
the potential consequences of any outbreak of fighting would be far more horrific.34 
32
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4.        Crisis Instability Theory and Proliferation Optimism 
Under conditions of crisis instability, the costfaenefit calculus for launching a 
nuclear attack is likely to differ from that described by proliferation optimists. 
Uncertainty over whether some of an adversary's warheads might survive a counterforce 
first strike - ordinarily so important to deterrence - matters much less if one believes that 
an adversary intends to launch a nuclear attack irrespective of what one does. Waltz asks, 
"why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?"35 The answer is that 
choosing not to fight may ensure that one will lose everything when one believes that an 
adversary is already planning a nuclear attack (i.e. that nuclear war is inevitable), and that 
the adversary's or one's own nuclear forces are vulnerable (i.e. that there is an advantage 
in striking first). Preemption, rather than nuclear restraint, becomes the logical 
imperative, and the "easy clarity" of nuclear deterrence assumed by proliferation 
optimists is lost. The question, "do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten," 
which seems absurd when asked in the abstract, could be very pertinent to leaders who 
perceived imminent nuclear war as a reality. 
Optimists might counter that crisis instability is nonetheless unlikely because the 
logic of deterrence dictates against the development of perceptions that nuclear war is 
instability during conditions that Pakistani officials themselves see as stable - is suggestive of a rather 
insidious danger associated with crisis instability. To the extent that Pakistani (or Indian) perceptions of a 
given level of crisis stability are accurate, the danger of inadvertent nuclear war may indeed be small. A 
real danger, however, may stem from inaccurate or dissimilar perceptions of the level of crisis stability by 
Indian and Pakistani leaders, a condition that could promote dangerous decision-making. The problem of 
perceptions suggests one way in which the deterrent value associated with crisis instability under the 
stability-instability paradox might fail to prevent the occurrence of a devastating war. See Scott D. Sagan, 
"Nuclear Safety and Security in South Asia," Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities 
for New Administrations, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group Occasional Paper No. 4, ed. Michael 
Barletta (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2000). 
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inevitable - why would decision-makers come to believe that their adversaries were 
planning a nuclear attack despite the possibility of receiving a devastating response? The 
answer is that events during a crisis may cause decision-makers to interpret their 
adversaries' actions in the worst possible light, and even to doubt the rationality of their 
opponents. That erroneous perceptions of an adversary's intentions are both theoretically 
possible and historically demonstrable has been shown convincingly by Jervis in 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, an authoritative work on this 
subject. Jervis demonstrates that processes of human perception are highly susceptible to 
error, being subject to imperfect information, psychological biases, and faulty learning. In 
The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, he applies these findings to the possibility of 
misperceptions of inevitable nuclear conflict, noting that the impact of stress, information 
overload, and a variety of psychological phenomena can make ambiguous indications that 
an adversary might be planning an attack far more convincing than would otherwise be 
the case.36 
The history of Indo-Pakistani crises provides specific examples of behavior that 
could contribute to perceptions in one state that the other was planning a nuclear attack. 
This is not to suggest that South Asian decision makers have been especially 
irresponsible during previous crises, but rather that they have not been immune to the 
same types of problems now widely known to have plagued officials in other nuclear- 
armed states.37 In an incident eerily similar to a potentially disastrous overflight of the 
Soviet Union by an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in the midst of the Cuban 
36
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37
 Sagan and Waltz 52-55. 
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Missile Crisis, an Indian MiG-25 flew a reconnaissance mission over Pakistan during the 
1990 Kashmir crisis.38 As in the case of the U-2 flight, the Indian reconnaissance mission 
was authorized by military commanders as a matter of routine, without the notification of 
senior government officials who might have been reluctant to risk such provocative 
activity.39 During the same crisis, Pakistani leaders are alleged to have carried out at least 
"some activities that suggested preparations for a nuclear strike, possibly to provoke 
Washington's intervention to resolve the crisis."40 When fighting broke out near Kargil in 
the summer of 1999, senior Indian officials warned that their country's response to 
Pakistan-supported incursions in Kashmir might include cross-border attacks or "hot 
pursuit" of fleeing insurgents. Pakistan's foreign minister threatened the use of nuclear 
weapons if Indian forces violated the LOC, the first overt nuclear threat ever made during 
the course of open hostilities between the two countries.41 While some efforts to control 
escalation of the fighting were evident, Indian aircraft were employed aggressively near 
the border (two of which crashed on the Pakistani side of the LOC), substantial portions 
of the Indian army were redeployed, and the Indian navy maneuvered in strength off the 
38
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southern coast of Pakistan.42 In the future, the kinds of organizational behaviors and 
deliberate posturing described above could contribute to perceptions of imminent war. 
Evidence also indicates that senior Indian and Pakistani officials regard the 
intentions of their neighbors with deep suspicion and at times have doubted their 
adversaries' capacity for rational decision-making under crisis conditions. During the 
Brasstacks crisis, "Pakistani intelligence suggested that Indians thought Zia [Pakistan's 
prime minister] was 'on his last legs' politically, and that Sindh [a region in Pakistan with 
a history of insurrection] was ripe for a repeat of the 1971 war."43 Zia himself went 
further, noting, "We feel that India has not... yet been reconciled to the existence of 
Pakistan... There is some lurking suspicion in the minds of some Indian leaders about the 
existence of Pakistan. Is it going to last? Is it going to collapse?"44 During the 1990 
Kashmir crisis, Indian Prime Minister Singh confirmed India's suspicions of the stability 
of Pakistan's government, declaring his belief that no one in Islamabad was in control of 
the country.45 Sagan indicates that Indian concerns over Pakistan's viability as a state 
have increased in recent years, writing, "leaders in New Delhi have declared publicly that 
they believe Pakistan is now a 'terrorist state' under the influence of Islamic 
fundamentalist forces, and now privately discuss their fears that Pakistan may collapse 
into chaos and civil conflict."46 In such an environment, nuclear decision makers in either 
42
 Sidhu, "India's Doctrine" 138-39, 143. 
43
 Hagerty, Consequences 108. 
^Hagerty, Consequences 109. 
45
 Hagerty, Consequences 147. 
46
 Sagan, "Nuclear Safety" 37. 
21 
State might be inclined to assume the worst about the reported military activities of the 
other. 
Crisis instability theory and evidence from the region thus suggest that optimists' 
assessments of the danger of nuclear war in South Asia are overly sanguine. While the 
level of deterrence provided by even rudimentary nuclear capabilities will probably be 
sufficient to prevent the launching of a premeditated nuclear attack during periods of 
calm or low-level hostility, a different logic could come to prevail during future Indo- 
Pakistani crises. If South Asian leaders begin to perceive that nuclear war is imminent, 
and believe that there is a significant advantage to striking first, then substantial pressures 
will exist to do so. From this perspective, the fact that nuclear war did not erupt as a 
result of Indo-Pakistani crises of the 1990s is attributable less to the robustness of nuclear 
deterrence than to the fortunate fact that circumstances never drove decision makers to 
subscribe to such beliefs. Had these crises escalated to the point where general war truly 
seemed inevitable, inadvertent nuclear war might well have been the result. 
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III.    SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE THREAT OF 
INADVERTENT WAR 
A.        DETERMINING THE  POTENTIAL  FOR INADVERTENT NUCLEAR 
WAR IN SOUTH ASIA 
Is the good fortune experienced by India and Pakistan during past crises likely to 
hold during future confrontations? How probable is it that Indian and Pakistani decision- 
makers could come to subscribe to Jervis's twin beliefs during periods of tension or low- 
level hostilities? How can the prospects for inadvertent war in South Asia be assessed? 
The force structures adopted by India and Pakistan as they develop their nuclear 
capabilities during the next decade may exert a decisive influence on the potential for 
both of the perceptions necessary for inadvertent war during future South Asian crises. 
Nuclear force structures have a straightforward relationship to force vulnerability, and 
hence to the potential for perceptions of first-strike advantage. The numbers and types of 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems deployed by each side will form the basis for 
determinations of how vulnerable each arsenal is to an attack by the other. Certain 
delivery systems are more useful than others for conducting surprise attacks on nuclear 
forces or command and control (C2) structures, and may be more or less vulnerable to 
attacks themselves.47 Meanwhile, the nuclear force structures of adversarial nations can 
also strongly influence the manner in which those forces interact during peacetime, crisis, 
and war. The vulnerabilities generated by nuclear force structures may influence the 
47
 In current literature, a number of abbreviations exist to describe the personnel and equipment 
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confusion, the term "command and control" (C2) will be used throughout this paper to describe the systems 
needed to properly direct nuclear forces, and is meant to be inclusive. 
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adoption offeree postures and nuclear doctrines that in turn create pressures for mutually 
reinforcing alerts during periods of tension. When coupled with the deficiencies of even 
the best intelligence and warning systems, such tightly coupled alert postures can create a 
significant potential for erroneous perceptions of imminent nuclear war. 
Assessing the impact that India and Pakistan's developing nuclear force structures 
will have upon the potential for inadvertent war in South Asia requires an examination of 
the force structure alternatives available to each nation. Neither India nor Pakistan has 
committed itself irreversibly to the construction of specific numbers and types of nuclear 
weapons or delivery systems, and a variety of future force structures are possible. The 
effects of these alternative force structures must be considered with South Asia's 
geographic circumstances and strategic environment in mind. Only by matching theory 
with the particulars of the South Asian case can unsubstantiated generalizations be 
avoided and firmly grounded conclusions drawn about the potential for inadvertent 
nuclear war in the region. 
Such an analysis reveals that as regional nuclear forces develop during the next 
decade, there is good reason for concern about the prospects for crisis instability and 
inadvertent nuclear conflict. Even in their current state, South Asian force structures are 
sufficiently vulnerable to attack that both the possibility of perceptions of first-strike 
vulnerability and the potential for mistaken beliefs of the inevitability of nuclear war are 
substantial. If India and Pakistan's capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons increase - 
especially through the introduction and operationalization of ballistic missile forces - the 
potential for inadvertent war during future crises will be even greater. 
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B.        SOUTH ASIAN FORCE STRUCTURES AND PERCEPTIONS OF FIRST 
STRIKE ADVANTAGE 
1.        Force Size 
a.        Numerical Estimates of India and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons 
Inventories 
While estimates of the current quantities of nuclear weapons possessed by 
India and Pakistan vary, recent open-source studies of both countries' fissile material 
production capabilities provide fairly consistent assessments of the maximum number of 
weapons that will be available to each country during the next decade. These figures give 
a reasonable idea as to the size of the nuclear arsenals that might factor in future South 
Asian crises. Estimates for the ten-year period beginning in 2000 are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Estimated Maximum South Asian Nuclear Weapons Inventories 
Maximum Inventory by Year* 
Country        2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
India 50-100        60-110        70-130        80-170        90-210       100-250 
Pakistan 32-56 36-64 40-72 44-80 48-88 52-96 
* For upper-end Indian estimates, annual warhead production capacity is assumed 
to rise to 10 weapons per year after 2002, and 20 weapons per year from 2004. See 
text below. 
To date, the Indian nuclear weapons program has relied primarily upon the 
reprocessing of plutonium for its stocks of fissile material, though pilot-level programs 
for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were in place as of the late 1990s, 
and might eventually be used to augment India's fissile material supply. India operates 
two unsafeguarded heavy-water research reactors that are thought to be the primary 
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source of weapon grade plutonium, though the reprocessing of fuel from the country's six 
heavy water power reactors would make additional plutonium available. The limited 
capacity of India's reprocessing facilities, rather than the ability of its operating reactors 
to produce plutonium, currently may be the limiting factor in how much weapon grade 
material India can produce per year.48 
Using an analytical model that accounts for the wide divergence in 
published data on the productive capacity of India's nuclear infrastructure, David 
Albright estimates a 90 percent statistical probability that India had enough fissile 
material for 45-95 weapons at the end of 1999, 65 being the median number.49 This 
number compares well with other published estimates.50 India's current plutonium 
production and reprocessing capabilities are believed to be sufficient for about five new 
nuclear weapons per year. If thermonuclear weapons are constructed, and India's 
capability to enrich uranium is not expanded, then the number may be fewer. If India's 
plutonium reprocessing capacity is increased, it might be able to produce as many as 
twenty weapons per year.51 When coupled with Albright's estimates of India's 1999 
48
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fissile material inventory, these differing calculations of India's productive capacity 
would provide the country enough fissile material for 50 to 100 weapons at the end of 
2000 (assuming that it would take India several years to improve its reprocessing 
capabilities) and from 100 to 250 weapons by 2010. 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is believed to have relied thus far 
upon highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the type of fissile material in its devices. 
Pakistan reportedly manufactured its first HEU in 1985, and has operated a large-scale 
enrichment facility since 1987.52 Since April of 1998, Pakistan also has had the 
theoretical capability to produce substantial amounts of weapon grade plutonium using 
fuel from its heavy water reactor at Khushab, though Pakistani officials deny that their 
country possesses the ability to reprocess reactor fuel.53 U.S. intelligence officials, 
watchdog organizations, and nuclear industry journals have reported that Pakistan has at 
least an experimental reprocessing capability and that some reprocessing appears to be 
underway.54 
Albright estimates that Pakistan had enough fissile material at the end of 
1999 to manufacture 30 to 52 nuclear weapons, with 39 as the median quantity.55 As in 
might become the limiting factor in the rate at which the country's arsenal could expand. 
52
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the case of his estimates of India's fissile material, these numbers compare relatively well 
with those calculated by other analysts.56 If Pakistan's uranium enrichment capacity 
remains unchanged in the future, one analyst postulates that it will be able to produce two 
to three new weapons a year (perhaps more if the LEU in its stockpile has not been 
utilized).57 Meanwhile, a recent RAND study estimates that Pakistan could produce 1.7 
weapons per year from HEU and another 2.2 weapons per year from reprocessed fuel 
from Khushab, for a total of almost four weapons per year.58 Using Albright's low- and 
high-end estimates of Pakistan's fissile material inventory at the end of 1999, these 
productive capacities would give Pakistan a maximum inventory of 32 to 56 warheads at 
the end of 2000, and from 52 to 96 warheads by the end of 2010. 
During the next few years, the numbers of nuclear weapons available to 
India and Pakistan during a crisis would likely be smaller than the above data indicate. 
Senior U.S. government officials believe that India may have manufactured few actual 
weapons from its stockpile of fissile material thus far, suggesting that as few as five 
devices may be assembled or immediately available for use.59 A recent report that only 
one of the nuclear devices tested by India in 1998 was a usable weapon provides tentative 
support for the notion that the process of weaponizing the country's nuclear materials 
calculations. 
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may be less far advanced than previously thought.60 Meanwhile, the same U.S. officials 
who doubt high-end estimates of India's nuclear capabilities believe that Pakistan has 
made much greater use of its fissile material inventory to manufacture weapons, a 
conclusion that finds support in the generally more significant steps that Pakistan has 
taken to define a military command structure for them.61 During the first years of the 21st 
century, Pakistan may have a slightly larger number of nuclear weapons ready for use 
than India, though India's greater resources and more substantial nuclear infrastructure 
should give it the ability to redress this imbalance in short order if the decision is made to 
do so. Both nations seem likely to have tens of weapons ready at mid-decade for delivery 
by whatever means are available. 
b.        Impact of Force Size 
A number of authors have contended that small nuclear arsenals like those 
that will be available to India and Pakistan during the next decade need not be especially 
vulnerable to preemptive attack, and have even suggested that there may be survivability 
advantages associated with the possession of only a few weapons. Small numbers of 
nuclear weapons should be relatively easy to camouflage or otherwise conceal, and their 
survivability during periods of tension should be enhanced by the fact that regional 
60
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adversaries considering preemption will also have only a few weapons with which to 
conduct an attack.62 Small arsenals should also require less elaborate (and hence less 
detectable and less targetable) supporting infrastructures and C systems than larger 
ones.63 Especially if warheads are mounted on mobile ballistic missiles, it is argued, 
preemptive attacks on small nuclear forces should be all but impossible. "Would be 
counterforce shooters," writes Jordan Seng, "may simply find nothing to shoot at."64 
Unfortunately, the small size of the Indian and Pakistani arsenals is 
unlikely in and of itself to be a stabilizing factor during crises. The fact that small 
arsenals provide each side with fewer weapons with which to conduct preemptive strikes 
is offset by the smaller number of counterforce targets that would have to be hit to ensure 
a reasonable degree of success, and the additional use of conventional forces (such as 
aircraft with precision-guided munitions) for counterforce attacks would tend to make 
small arsenals even more vulnerable.65 In fact, for opposing nuclear arsenals with a given 
62
 Karl 104-5; Sagan and Waltz 19-21. 
63
 Jordan Seng asserts that the small size of the arsenals of new nuclear states also alleviates dangers 
of unauthorized use that dispersal and concealment strategies might entail by limiting the number of 
personnel who must be recruited, screened, and ultimately entrusted with the safeguarding of the weapons. 
This and other command and control advantages that he ascribes to small nuclear arsenals are discussed in 
the next section of this chapter. See "Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear 
States," Security Studies 6.4 (Summer 1997): 50-92. 
64
 Seng 70. 
65 Sidhu reports that "conventional counterforce" has been an important part of the Indian military's 
planning for nuclear war since the early 1980s. See "India's Doctrine" pp. 128-30. Meanwhile, Peter Amett 
notes that India's ability to conduct conventional strikes against nuclear targets has increased in recent 
years with the acquisition of laser-guided bomb kits from the United States. The text of India's draft 
nuclear doctrine (though not an official policy document of the Indian government) provides evidence that 
thinking along these lines continues, stating, "effective conventional military capabilities shall be 
maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat 
or use of nuclear weapons" and "the Indian defense forces shall be in a position to execute operations n an 
NBC environment with minimal degradation." Some analysts have interpreted this language as indicative 
of India's readiness to use conventional forces in a nuclear counterforce role, giving it the ability to launch 
a disarming first strike while shifting the onus of nuclear first use to Pakistan. See Amett; Cheema 176-77; 
and Sections 2.7 and 5.5 of India, Government of India, Report of National Security Advisory Board on 
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mix of delivery systems, smaller arsenals are in some ways likely to induce instability, if 
for no other reason than that preemption may seem most promising as a strategy for 
damage limitation when the number of nuclear weapons possessed by adversaries is 
small. A strike that destroyed 75 percent of an adversary's arsenal of 20 weapons, for 
example, would leave the adversary only five for retaliation against the attacker, a return 
blow that the attacker might deem acceptable in the event that nuclear war was perceived 
as inevitable. An equally successful preemption (percentage wise) against an arsenal of 
100 weapons would leave 25, and against an arsenal of 1000 a remainder of 250. As 
arsenals of hypothetical adversaries increase in size, the number of weapons surviving 
after even a very "successful" counterforce first strike becomes great enough to render 
discussion of damage limitation increasingly meaningless. Such a dynamic developed 
during the Cold War, where the arsenals of the superpowers grew so large that chances 
for damage limitation by first strikes against weapons and delivery systems alone all but 
vanished.66 
The small size of India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals is likely to 
contribute to perceptions of first-strike advantage in several other ways. When arsenals 
are small, minor differences in the weapons inventories of adversaries (consisting of even 
Draft Nuclear Doctrine, 17 Aug. 1999, 13 Mar. 2000 
<http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html>. 
66
 Paul S. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons (New Haven: Yale UP, 1983) 87. 
The point here is that the small size of India and Pakistan's arsenals does not preclude (and may enhance) 
pressures for preemption in the event of crisis. This is not to suggest that larger arsenals are inherently 
stabilizing. Bruce G. Blair reveals that during the Cold War, the large number of targets that the massive 
U.S. arsenal was tasked with destroying effectively increased its vulnerability by making threats to even a 
small portion of the force unacceptable to U.S. planners. On the Soviet side, an especially pronounced need 
to maintain centralized command of nuclear forces in order to achieve doctrinal war aims meant that 
command and control vulnerability negated many of the survivability benefits of a large arsenal. See The 
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993). 
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a handful of warheads) may seem very significant, leading to "exchange ratio" 
# 
calculations that create perceptions of first-strike vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, if South 
Asian nuclear weapons are to be made more mobile to enhance their survivability, steps 
will have to be taken to "operationalize" them by turning them over to military units.67 
As Sagan notes, the communications and organizational routines of operating military 
units "often produce 'signatures' to enemy intelligence agencies that inadvertently reveal 
secret information and the location of otherwise 'hidden' military forces."68 Indian and 
Pakistani C2 structures are likely to have the locations of their hidden command posts, 
transmitters, and the like revealed over time by this process. Having fewer critical nodes 
and less redundancy than the C2 systems associated with larger arsenals, they are likely to 
be more vulnerable to "decapitating" attacks that paralyze nuclear forces by eliminating 
command systems and personnel or isolating them from the weapons they control.69 
2.        Nuclear Delivery Systems 
a.        Potential South Asian Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 
Currently, the ability of India and Pakistan to deliver nuclear weapons 
depends largely upon the use of aircraft, though both countries have ambitious programs 
in place for the development and production of ballistic missiles that could lead to the 
67
 India's weapons are still believed to be in the custody of civilian authorities, most likely the Defense | 
Research and Development Organization (DRDO), and Pakistani warheads, while controlled by military 
authorities, are also likely not to be in the possession of the military units (such as aircraft squadrons or 
missile batteries) that would be tasked with employing them in the event of war. See Chari; Neil Joeck, 
"Weaponization in South Asia," Proliferation Brief 3.20, 20 July 2000, Carnegie Endowment for ' 
International Peace, 9 Nov. 2000 <http://www.ceip.org>; Koch "Nuclear Friction"; and Farah Zarah, 
"Pakistan's   Road   to   a   Minimum   Nuclear   Deterrent,"   Arms   Control   Today   July-Aug.    1999 i 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/julaug99/fzja99.htm>. 
68
 Scott D. Sagan, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," 
International Security 22.2 (Fall 1997): 197. 
69
 For a description of the complex C2 system developed by the United States during the Cold War see 
Bracken, especially Ch. 6. 
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fielding of such delivery systems in quantity. Both India and Pakistan almost certainly 
have warheads designed for use in aerial bombs, and they may each possess some 
weapons adapted for use on missiles as well. 
To date, the Indian government has been reluctant to authorize the mass 
production of missiles explicitly designed for nuclear weapons delivery. This hesitation 
stems in part from U.S. pressure to halt the fielding of ballistic missiles, and also from the 
wariness of Indian officials (including both political leaders and senior scientists) about 
involving the country's military in nuclear decision-making.70 While Indian Air Force 
(IAF) pilots can be trained in the basics of nuclear weapons delivery with little change in 
the military's nuclear responsibilities, the construction of large numbers of nuclear- 
capable missiles would generate organizational pressures for the creation of the new 
kinds of military units needed to employ them.71 Such developments would almost 
certainly enhance the role of senior officers in the formulation of nuclear policies, and 
might make current arrangements for the custody of nuclear weapons (with warheads 
probably  in  the  possession  the  civilian-run  Defense  Research  and  Development 
Organization) infeasible. 
Pakistan's military regime has moved more rapidly towards 
operationalizing its nation's nascent missile capabilities, and may already have done so to 
some degree. Senior U.S. officials suggest that Pakistan at least has the capability to 
nee 
70
 Sawhney "Evolving Nuclear Environment Moulds India's Military Strategy," Jane's Intelligei 
Review Aug. 2000:   41; Sidhu, "India's Doctrine" 145-57. India may have flight-tested an Agni series 
ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead lacking its fissile components. See Chari. 
71
 The Indian Air Force is alleged to have practiced "toss bombing" techniques for the delivery of 
nuclear weapons by aircraft since the late 1970s. See Sidhu, "India's Doctrine" 132. 
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ready nuclear-capable missiles for use on short notice.72 Other sources, however, indicate 
that a decision to formally incorporate ballistic missiles into Pakistan's nuclear arsenal 
would depend upon a corresponding move by India.73 It may be that Pakistani leaders are 
wary of starting a missile race in which their country, with its limited financial resources, 
would ultimately be at a significant disadvantage. 
Even without the introduction of ballistic missiles, India and Pakistan have 
a substantial capacity to deliver nuclear weapons at distances that exceed 1,000 
kilometers, sufficient range to place civilian and military targets throughout all of 
Pakistan and most of India at risk. Both the Indian and Pakistani air forces possess a 
variety of aircraft that are suitable for use as nuclear delivery vehicles. Virtually all of the 
fixed-wing combat aircraft in their respective inventories are variants of types with 
nuclear capabilities in their countries of origin. For reasons of both cost and capability, 
however, limited numbers of "tactical" fighter-bomber aircraft are most likely to be 
adapted by each country for a nuclear strike role.74 India, with greater numbers of recent- 
generation aircraft, would probably select only the more capable aircraft in its inventory 
72
 Windrem and Kupperman. 
73
 Some sources also suggest that Pakistan's ballistic missiles may not become operational until 
sufficient quantities of plutonium are available for the construction of miniaturized warheads. See "...and 
the Federation of American Scientists Displays Pakistan's Secret Missile Base," Jane's Missiles and 
Rockets May 2000, 24 Nov. 2000 <http://www.janesonline.com>; "Pakistan's Nuclear and Missile 
Facilities Revealed," Federation of American Scientists Public Eye, 15 Mar. 2000, Federation of American 
Scientists, 24 Nov. 2000 <http://www.fas.org/eye/indo-pak.html>. Pakistani officials have claimed that 
their country has developed and shock tested a warhead design or use on the Ghauri missile, though it is 
unclear whether actual warheads are available for use. See Umer Farooq, "Pakistan Ready to Arm Ghauri 
with Warheads," Jane's Defense Weekly 3 June 1998: 4. For other comments on the status of Pakistani 
weaponization, see Joeck, "Weaponization in South Asia," Koch "Nuclear Friction" 23; Pravin K. 
Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores Over India in Ballistic Missile Race," Jane's Intelligence Review Nov. 2000: 
31-35; andZhara. 
74
 Other types of aircraft possessed by the two countries (including bomber derivatives such as India's 
Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft) are few in number, might require costly modifications to convert for use as 
nuclear delivery systems, and are unlikely to be as survivable in an over-land strike role as smaller jet 
fighter-bombers. 
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for nuclear missions, while Pakistan might be forced to employ some relatively older 
types alongside its handful of F-16s.75 
Comparative data on the most likely Indian and Pakistani aircraft to be 
used for nuclear weapons delivery is shown below in Table 2. Aircraft inventories are 
approximate, with numbers shown reflecting open literature reports of aircraft sales, 
indigenous construction, and operational attrition. As it displays data on only those 
aircraft most likely to be employed in a nuclear role, Table 2 may give a misleading 
impression as to the relative sizes and capabilities of the Indian and Pakistani air forces. 
In addition to the fighter-bombers shown in the table, India possesses over 700 MiG-21, 
MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29 aircraft. Pakistan, by contrast, has only about 220 fighter- 
bomber aircraft besides those shown in the table, most of which are Chinese-built copies 
of the elderly MiG-19 and the MiG-21. This disparity in aerial strength is likely to 
contribute to Pakistani desires to base at least a part of the country's nuclear deterrent 
upon a force of ballistic missiles. 
75
 Among the aircraft of the IAF, the French-built Mirage 2000 stands out in various accounts as the 
aircraft most likely designated for use in the delivery of nuclear weapons. Unconfirmed reports have 
indicated that the avionics of India's existing Mirages are optimized for strike missions. Another report 
states that India has concluded negotiations for the purchase of 40 new Mirage 2000D aircraft. The 2000D 
is a conventional strike variant of the Mirage 2000N, an aircraft employed by the French air force in a 
nuclear attack role. See Rahul Bedi, "Indian Ties with France Will Soar with Mirage Buy," Jane's Defense 
Weekly 1 Sep. 1999: 13, and "Dassault Mirage 2000," Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2000-2001. 
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Table 2. Potential South Asian Nuclear Delivery Aircraft 
Aircraft Inventory* 
Performance 
Country Max. External Payload (kg) Combat Radius** (km) 
India Jaguar 125 4763 1408 
Mirage 2000 40 6300 1205 
Su-30 18 >8000 3000 
Pakistan A-5 50 2000 600 
Mirage III/5 165 4000 1200/1300 
F-16 32 8256 1252 
* Totals include combat capable trainers, but not dedicated maritime strike variants of the Jaguar 
and Mirage 5. 
** Combat radii given are for high altitude-low altitude-high altitude ("hi-lo-hi") mission profiles 
with aircraft in typical conventional strike configurations. 
Sources: Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook 1999; Jane's Information Group; Pakistan Institute 
for Air Defense Studies. 
If the decision is made to do so, both India and Pakistan have the ability to add 
ballistic missiles to their nuclear forces in substantial numbers during the next decade. 
India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) has produced two 
series of missiles with potential for use as nuclear delivery vehicles, designated Prithvi 
and Agni. The initial production version of the Prithvi is already in service with an Indian 
army unit (though the operational readiness of this unit has been questioned) and the IAF 
is conducting trials with an extended range variant.76 In the past, the Indian government 
76
 "Prithvi Garrison [Probable] Research Center Imarat (RCI) 17°14' N 78°29'E," Federation of 
American Scientists Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of American Scientists, 10 Nov. 2000 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/facility/hyderabad-rci-p.htm>; Sawhney 33-34. At least one sea- 
based version of the Prithvi is also being developed, but seems unlikely to become an operational weapon 
system in the near term: the Dhanush, intended for shipboard use, crashed into the sea shortly after launch 
during its only test in April of 2000. Stabilization of the launch platform may have been a problem, and use 
of the Prithvi's volatile fuel makes the missile far from ideal for service at sea. A missile called Sagarika, 
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has emphasized that these missiles are conventional weapons, though they should have a 
sufficient payload capacity to carry some nuclear cargoes.77 Use of the Prithvi in a 
nuclear role would be constrained by its short range and the limitations imposed by its 
volatile liquid fuel system. The missiles would have be moved close to the Indo-Pakistani 
border before firing, would require significant preparation time prior to launch 
(reportedly as much as two hours), and the large number of vehicles apparently needed to 
support a Prithvi battery might make its prolonged deployment in the field difficult.78 
India's Agni, by contrast, might be produced and fielded more easily as 
part of an operational nuclear force. The Agni 2, the most sophisticated version of the 
missile tested thus far, uses solid fuel in each of its two rocket stages, is designed to be 
road- or rail-mobile, and may utilize a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver to 
improve its accuracy.79 With a claimed design range of 3,000 kilometers, the Agni 2 
could reach targets throughout Pakistan from anywhere in India, though it lacks the range 
reportedly under development for use aboard submarines, has been alternately described as either a Prithvi 
derivative or a cruise missile. See Kanti Bajpai, "India's Nuclear Posture After Pokhran II," International 
Studies (New Delhi) 37.4 (Oct.-Dec. 2000): 23; Rahul Bedi, "Crash Ends Maiden Flight of India's Dhanush 
Missile," Jane's Missiles and Rockets June 2000 and "India's Missiles to be Nuclear Armed," Jane's 
Missiles and Rockets June 1998, both available at <http://www.janesonline.com>; Andrew W. Hull, "In 
Search of the Real Sagarika," Jane's Intelligence Review July 2000: 24; and "Sagarika/Dhanush," 
Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of American Scientists, 13 Nov. 2000 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/sagarika.htm>. 
77
 Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Adelphi Paper 312 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): 68. 
78
 These qualities impose serious limitations on the employment of the Prithvi in a conventional role 
as well, and reportedly have contributed to the missile's unpopularity with senior Indian military officers. 
See "Prithvi (SS-150/-250/-350)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems. (Alexandria: Jane's Information 
Group, 2000); Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores" 33-34. 
79
 "Agni 1/2/3/4," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Alexandria: Jane's Information Group, 2000); 
"South Asian Missile Development," Oct. 2000, Arms Control Association, 14 Oct. 2000 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/agni.htm>. 
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to threaten much of China, India's other strategic rival.80 This limitation may be another 
reason that India has yet to mass-produce the missile, with officials awaiting the 
development of the even longer-range Agni 3.81 
The assortment of ballistic missiles that Pakistan might employ as nuclear 
delivery vehicles is even more varied than that available to India. Tracking missile 
developments in Pakistan is difficult, in part because a number of Pakistani missiles 
appear to have multiple designations (making it unclear whether new names always refer 
to new systems) and also because some missiles described in official Pakistani statements 
may be entirely fictitious. Pakistan is believed currently to possess significant numbers of 
short-range missiles, including the Hatf 1 and Chinese-designed M-l 1. The latter missile 
may have been re-designated Hatf 2 or Tarmuk (borrowing the former name from an 
improved version of the Hatf 1 whose development appears to have been cancelled) and 
now probably is being produced in Pakistan.82 In 1997, the government of Pakistan 
reported the testing of an extended range Hatf 3 (which may have been either a Hatf I or 
M-l 1 derivative), but there has been no official mention of the missile since this test was 
80
 Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores" 33. 
81
 Koch "Nuclear Friction" 22. Cruise missiles are another possible future nuclear delivery system for 
India, with the Indian navy having taken delivery of its first 3M54E "Club" missiles from Russia late in 
2000. Although the missiles purchased reportedly lack a land attack capability and have a maximum range 
of only 220km, the transfer of these advanced weapons might further Indian efforts to develop a nuclear- 
capable cruise missile. If the development of such missiles is undertaken, service introduction before the 
end of the present decade seems unlikely given financial constraints, demanding technical requirements 
(including the need to develop miniaturized warheads and missiles with much greater range) and the 
generally slow pace of indigenous missile development efforts associated with India's Integrated Guided 
Missile Development Program (IGMDP). See A.D. Baker "Combat Fleets," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings Nov. 2000: 92; Gopi Rethinaraj and Clifford Singer, "Going Global: India Aims for a Credible 
Nuclear Doctrine," Jane's Intelligence Review Feb. 2001: 50-51; and Steve Zaloga, "India Joins the 
Russian Naval Missile System Club," Jane's Intelligence Review Dec. 2000: 43-45. 
82
 Mark Hewish, "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves: Missiles Have Become Instruments of 'Coercive 
Diplomacy,'" Jane's International Defense Review Oct. 2000: 41; Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores" 35; United 
States, Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1997): 20. 
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announced.83 As with the Indian government and the Prithvi, Pakistani officials have 
denied that the M-ll has a nuclear role, though the U.S. intelligence community 
estimated in the mid-1990s that Pakistan's scientists probably had at least attempted to 
design a nuclear warhead for the missile.84 The M-ll reportedly entered service with a 
Pakistan army unit in 1997.85 
Given the limited range of the M-l 1, it is hardly surprising that Pakistan's 
efforts to develop nuclear-armed ballistic missiles appear to have shifted in recent years 
towards work on newer and more capable types, the Ghauri and Shaheen series. The 
original Ghauri is a liquid-fueled missile (believed by most analysts to be the North 
Korean No Dong or a derivative) for which the Pakistani government already claims to 
have developed and shock tested a warhead. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that a small 
number of these missiles may be available for immediate introduction into operational 
service.86 Pakistan claims to have flight-tested an improved version called the Ghauri 2, 
and scientists have reportedly tested the engines of a further-improved Ghauri 3.87 The 
83
 As the alleged Half 3 launch has never been confirmed by other sources, and coincided with a 
public outcry in Pakistan over reports that India had deployed Prithvi missiles near the Indo-Pakistani 
border, it seems likely that the test was faked. See "Hatf-3/Shaheen-I/M-ll," Federation of American 
Scientists Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of American Scientists, 13 Nov. 2000 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/rnissile/hatf-3.htm>. 
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 Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability 69; Jones, et al. 136. 
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 Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores" 35. 
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 Paul Beaver, "Pakistan 'Faked Ghauri Missile Pictures,'" Jane's Missiles and Rockets June 1998, 
24 Nov. 2000; "Pakistan's Missile 'Was a Nodong'," Jane's Missiles and Rockets May 1998, 29 Nov. 2000 
<http://www.janesonline.com>. 
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 At least one U.S. intelligence official is skeptical as to whether the Ghauri 2 exists. The Ghauri 2 
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Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2, meanwhile, are solid-fuel, mobile systems that may be further 
derivatives of the M-ll or perhaps other Chinese missiles.88 U.S. intelligence analysts 
believe that Pakistan is capable of indigenously producing most of the components 
required to build the Shaheen l.89 
Comparative data on Indian and Pakistani ballistic missiles is displayed below in 
Table 3. The information presented is speculative, based upon open-source analyses and 
the unverifiable claims of the Indian and Pakistani governments. Where the information 
available in unclassified literature is contradictory, the numbers shown reflect the 
author's assessment of source credibility. 
New Missiles; U.S. Urges Restraint," Arms Control Today Apr.-May 1999, 14 Oct. 2000 
<http://www.armcontrol.org/ACT/aprmay99/ipam99.htrn>; "Pakistan Completes 'Trials' of Ghauri-III 
Missile Engine," News (Islamabad) 30 Sep. 1999: 10. 
88
 Sources have indicated that the Shaheen series missiles may be derived from the Chinese M-ll 
series, M-9, or M-18. Photographs of the Shaheen 1 and its Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) show a 
particularly strong resemblance to the M-ll. The Shaheen 2 is much larger than and otherwise visually 
dissimilar to the Shaheen 1, and may have different design origins. See entries "CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)," 
"CSS-7" (DF-ll/M-11), and "Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1)" in Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Alexandria: 
Jane's Information Group, 2000) and "Pakistan Shows Off New Shaheen 2 Ballistic Missile...," Jane's 
Missiles and Rockets May 2000,24 Nov. 2000 <http://www.janesonline.com>. 
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 Koch "Nuclear Friction" 22. 
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Table 3. South Asian Ballistic Missile Systems 
System* Type** Inventory Statust 
Performance 
Country Payload (kg) Range (km) CEP}(m) 
India Prithvi (P-l; SS-150) SRBM <75 0? 1000 150 150-200 
Prithvi (P-2; SS-250) SRBM <25 D/T 500 250 ? 










Agni 3 IRBM few to none D 1000 3000-5000 ? 
Pakistan Hatf I SRBM <20 O? 500 80-100 ? 
Half 2 (Shadoz) SRBM few to none C 500 300 ? 
Half'3 SRBM fictitious? C? 500 800 ? 
M-ll (Hatf 2? Tarmuk?) SRBM 30-85 O 800 300 200-600 
Shaheen 1 (Half 4; Tarmuk?) SRBM 5-10 O? 750 600 200 
Shaheen 2 MRBM few D 1000 2000-2500 350 
Ghauri 1 (Hatf 5; Ghaznavi?) MRBM 5-10 O? 700 1300 ? 





Ghauri 3 IRBM few to none D? ? 3000 ? 
* Alternate system names are listed in parenthesis. Where uncertainty exists, alternate designations are followed by a 
question mark. 
** Missile types are by range according to the following standards: SRBM < 1000 km; MRBM 1000-3000 km; 
IRBM 3000-5500 km. 
t Status of missile programs is as follows: O = Operational; C = Program Cancelled (some missiles may remain available); 
D/T = Development/Flight Testing; D = Development. 
% CEP = Circular Error Probable, a measure of missile accuracy. In general terms, a missile with a CEP of 200m has a fifty 
percent probability of landing within a 200m radius of its target. 
Sources: Arms Control Association; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Federation of American Scientists; 
Jane's Information Group; United States Department of Defense; United States National Intelligence Council. 
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b.        Impact of Aircraft-Delivered Weapons 
What impact will the types of nuclear delivery systems available to India 
and Pakistan have upon regional perceptions of first strike vulnerability? If India and 
Pakistan maintain nuclear delivery capabilities based solely on aircraft-delivered gravity 
bombs, the vulnerability of both nations' nuclear forces will be significant. In such an 
environment, the survivability of both countries' nuclear forces would hinge upon the 
vulnerability of their airfields to attack, whether or not their nuclear warheads were 
dispersed or hidden elsewhere. A preemptive attack that destroyed or incapacitated either 
state's air bases would render that nation's arsenal impotent, even if all of its nuclear 
weapons survived. As John R. Harvey has noted, airfields and other support facilities 
upon which modern strike aircraft depend occupy fixed sites whose locations are 
generally well known, making them ready targets for preemptive attack.90 
In South Asia, pressures for preemption would be exacerbated by 
geographic circumstances. Because India and Pakistan share a common border, the flight 
times required for aircraft from either nation to reach targeted airfields in the other would 
be short, particularly if aircraft were operated from forward bases. With flight times so 
short, the amount of warning available to the victim of an attack would be brief, 
increasing force vulnerability. This holds especially true for Pakistan, which has 
relatively few air bases, most of which are less than 200 km (under ten minutes' flying 
time) from Indian territory.91 
90
 John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military 
Effectiveness," International Security \1.2 (Fall 1992): 47. 
91
 The Pakistan Institute for Air Defense Studies, an independent research organization, reports that 
the country has a total of 30 military airfields, including only ten "major operational bases" that are fully 
functional in peacetime, eleven "forward operational bases" that can be activated during wartime or crisis, 
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Perceptions of first-strike vulnerability arising from complete reliance on 
aircraft for nuclear missions would be offset somewhat by certain operational 
characteristics of these weapons systems. Strike aircraft can be tracked and shot down in 
flight by opposing air defenses, whether in the form of interceptors, surface-to-air 
missiles, or antiaircraft artillery, a fact that reduces the vulnerability of a defender and 
complicates the planning of an attacker. While flight times for attacking aircraft in South 
Asia would be short, the airspace over the Indo-Pakistani frontier is well monitored by 
both nations, and the victim of a preemptive attack by large numbers of aircraft would 
almost certainly have some tactical warning of the inbound strike (especially a large one) 
before it crossed the frontier, perhaps enough to increase warning time by a factor of two 
or three.92 Finally, India and Pakistan's air defense organizations are undoubtedly quite 
familiar with the operating patterns of each other's air forces. The changes in these 
patterns that would probably precede a nuclear first strike (such as a detectable increase 
in the number of aircraft being operated from forward airfields) would be likely to 
provide the prospective victim of air attack with a measure of strategic warning that could 
be used to place nuclear forces on alert and to prepare air defenses. 
From the perspective of crisis instability theory, reliance on warning for 
force survivability is an imperfect solution to the problem of vulnerability because forces 
and nine emergency "satellite" landing strips. Arnett cites a similar figure, and also notes that Pakistan has 
nine commercial airports capable of handling high-performance jet aircraft. A preemptive strike that 
targeted the ten major operating bases with a combination of nuclear weapons and conventional runway 
denial munitions (bombs designed to disperse mines or create especially large craters) might conceivably 
paralyze the Pakistan Air Force long enough to permit the complete destruction of its capability to deliver 
nuclear weapons. See Arnett and "PAP Organization & Structure: PAF Bases," Pakistan Institute for Air 
Defense Studies 23 Jan. 2001 <http://www.paids.com.pk/users/piads/bases.htm>. 
92
 In discussions of nuclear warfare, tactical warning refers to warning of an attack in progress. 
Strategic warning, by contrast, is warning of an impending attack, received before the attack is executed. 
These definitions are given by Bracken in The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, page 5. 
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dependent upon warning for their survival would have to be used before an enemy attack 
could be confirmed with certainty. "Launch-on-warning" nuclear postures are 
destabilizing because early warning systems can provide ambiguous or erroneous 
information, and so acting upon such information involves a risk of inadvertence.93 
Reliance on warning, in short, leaves open the possibility of being misled by false 
perceptions of inevitable war.94 
The best that can be said for the dependence of aircraft-delivered arsenals 
upon warning for their survival in an "aircraft only" nuclear environment is that 
authorities could choose to refrain from an actual launch decision until relatively late in 
the warning process, when the least ambiguous type of warning information would be 
available. The receipt of strategic warning information would necessitate increased alert 
levels to ensure force survival, but a decision to use nuclear weapons could wait until the 
enemy's attack began to materialize, that is, until the receipt of tactical warning. While a 
decision to wait would entail giving up chances for damage limitation through 
preemption (ready air defenses might still be expected to blunt the enemy's attack 
somewhat), decision makers could at least be reasonably sure that their own nuclear- 
capable aircraft, properly alerted, could be sent aloft in time to prevent their destruction. 
93
 Launch-on-warning doctrines, as their name implies, involve the rapid release of permission to use 
nuclear weapons in the event that warning of an adversary's nuclear attack is received. A decision to launch 
an attack on the basis of strategic warning would be synonymous with preemption, while doctrine that 
authorizes nuclear release upon receipt of tactical warning has also been described as "launch-under- 
attack." 
94
 In fact, a dependence on warning for force survival can serve to generate perceptions of imminent 
conflict, as is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
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c.        Impact of Nuclear-Armed Ballistic Missiles 
In view of the level of first strike force vulnerability associated with 
exclusive reliance on aircraft-delivered weapons, a number of analysts have argued that 
the addition of ballistic missiles to regional nuclear arsenals would enhance crisis 
stability. Karl, Lavoy, and Seng expect the mobility of most missile systems to enhance 
the viability of force survival strategies that employ dispersal and decoys to prevent 
counterforce targeting.95 They rightly cite the inability of the United States to locate and 
destroy Iraq's Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, despite U.S. possession 
of the most advanced reconnaissance and surveillance equipment in the world, as 
evidence of the difficulties that preemptive strike planners would face in attempting to 
target nuclear forces that employed similar delivery systems. "Anything less than very 
extensive and fairly immediate targeting intelligence [of the kind that regional nuclear 
powers are highly unlikely to have]," Seng writes, "will be too uncertain to support 
counterforce strikes."96 In such an environment, these scholars suggest, pressures for 
preemption derived from either the perceived vulnerability of an adversary's forces 
(encouraging preemption in the name of achieving significant damage limitation) or the 
perceived vulnerability of a nation's own forces (encouraging the same for the purpose of 
force preservation) should be minimal. 
Seng anticipates the arguments of proliferation pessimists that ballistic 
missiles will still create pressures for preemption among regional nuclear adversaries 
because they render C2 structures highly vulnerable to decapitating attacks. Even if these 
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nations' C2 systems are themselves vulnerable to preemptive attack by ballistic missiles, 
he argues that a simple doctrinal choice can eliminate pressures for preemption. C 
vulnerability only matters, he asserts, if nations adopt employment doctrines that require 
the destruction of "time critical" targets. Typically, these are military targets that must be 
struck quickly to limit damage to the attacking state (such as nuclear counterforce targets) 
or because other characteristics make their destruction difficult once the attacking state's 
C2 systems are degraded (targets such as conventional military forces in the field, which 
are mobile, or large numbers of infrastructure targets, which must be attacked in a 
coordinated fashion if the damage inflicted upon them is to be maximized). Since the 
mobility of ballistic missiles should make counterforce attacks all but impossible, Seng 
contends, regional nuclear powers should have little need for time critical targeting, and 
can instead adopt nuclear doctrines based entirely upon their ability to retaliate against 
countervalue targets such as cities, discarding destabilizing launch-on-warning doctrines 
in favor of "ride-it-out-and-retaliate" strategies.97 While such a posture would require the 
conditional pre-delegation of launch authority to the commanders of nuclear units (the 
permission to use nuclear weapons in the event of a decapitating attack), such pre- 
delegation would not entail an increase in crisis instability because these commanders 
would be under little time pressure to use their weapons: 
Fortunately, with concealment strategies, launch operators do not have to 
rush, and leaders can design and implement procedures for central 
consultations and confirmations. Operators could take the time to check 
with central leaders before pulling the trigger, opting to launch on their 
own authority only if and when it has become clear that central leaders 
have been eliminated. Central leaders, on their part, could analyze all 
relevant information before the order to launch was given. 
Misunderstandings between central authorities and field observers could 
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be sorted out. Failures in communications lines could be solved or 
circumvented. The lack of important intelligence could be addressed 
through careful analysis, human confirmation, supplementation of 
electronic signals, or perhaps through appeals to technologically advanced 
third-party states which could confirm attack conditions and extent.98 
Though pessimists might argue that the deployment of mobile, survivable nuclear forces 
will prove difficult for states like India and Pakistan because of the limitations of their C2 
systems and concerns about warhead theft or unauthorized use, Seng believes that these 
problems should not be insurmountable. Here again, the small size of these nations' 
arsenals is expected to be an advantage, reducing the need for complex, multi-layered 
communications channels and also number of personnel who must be screened for and 
entrusted with nuclear duties, thereby simplifying the C2 arrangements needed to 
maintain both positive and negative control over nuclear forces." 
The applicability to South Asia of arguments regarding the feasibility and 
survivability of simple C2 arrangements is seemingly bolstered by the credence given to 
them by some security analysts in the region. A number of Indian government officials 
and strategic theorists have indicated their belief in the viability of "retaliation after ride 
out" nuclear doctrines for small, mobile nuclear forces. Kanti Bajpai notes that in the 
mid-1990s General K. Sundarji and analyst K. Subrahmanyam allowed for delays of 24 
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hours or more in launching retaliatory strikes.100 In a more recent interview, Foreign 
Minister Jaswant Singh reiterated this view, noting that so long as forces are survivable, 
"retaliation does not have to be instantaneous."101 The Indian government's standing 
commitment to "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons, of course, is the most significant 
indicator of official confidence in C2 first-strike survivability and the feasibility of a 
"retaliation-only" nuclear doctrine. 
Unfortunately, there are serious deficiencies in arguments regarding the 
stabilizing effects of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, especially when applied to potential 
Indo-Pakistani nuclear crisis dynamics. For a number of reasons, the addition of nuclear- 
armed ballistic missiles to the arsenals of India and Pakistan would increase perceptions 
of first-strike vulnerability when compared with an environment where both states 
instead relied exclusively upon aircraft, and especially so from a Pakistani perspective. 
Ballistic missile deployments in South Asia would thus enhance pressures for preemption 
and thereby increase chances for inadvertent nuclear war. 
To begin with, ballistic missiles, even if nominally road- or rail-mobile, 
are unlikely to make South Asian arsenals as invulnerable to preemptive attacks as the 
analysts cited above presume. If introduced into service, missile warheads will account 
for only a portion of the already small nuclear arsenals that India and Pakistan deploy 
during the next decade. In peacetime, few of these missiles are likely to be deployed in a 
mobile mode, with most instead remaining in fixed garrisons. There are a variety of 
reasons for this, including the negative control challenges associated with routinely 
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having significant numbers of nuclear weapons deployed in the field, the fuel and repair 
costs that constant mobile operations entail, the need to perform periodic maintenance on 
warheads, missiles, and transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and to provide rest for 
missile crews, and even domestic or international political difficulties that may arise from 
deploying nuclear weapons in an overt manner.102 Even during periods of crisis, when 
dispersing missiles from their garrisons would make sense for survivability reasons, the 
desire to avoid provocative actions that might contribute to perceptions of imminent 
conflict would probably keep the majority of these weapons at their storage sites. 
Missiles remaining in garrison, nuclear capable aircraft, and C2 structures 
would all be highly vulnerable to an attack by the missiles of an adversary. India and 
Pakistan currently lack the early warning systems needed to detect and track missiles 
launched by the other, and even if such warning systems were to be constructed, the short 
flight times that missiles require to reach their targets would make the tactical warning 
that these systems provide of little use.103 Forces that could not be made survivable 
against first strikes would have to be used preemptively (on the basis of more ambiguous 
strategic warning) or not at all.  India and Pakistan currently lack the hardening 
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technologies needed to deploy missiles in individual silos, and garrisons that included 
concrete hangars or underground storage bunkers would not be invulnerable to attacks by 
missiles with accuracies and warhead yields on the order of those claimed for South 
Asian systems.104 Even if missiles in bunkers were to survive an attack by an adversary's 
missiles, blast damage to a garrison's above-ground components (such as bunker access 
doors and road or rail links) and the effects of electromagnetic radiation on equipment 
and personnel might delay their use long enough to allow enemy follow-on attacks with 
more accurate aircraft-delivered nuclear or conventional bombs.105 C systems would be 
similarly vulnerable, since even if command bunkers were numerous and well hidden 
enough to survive attack, communications equipment (especially that needed to 
communicate with mobile forces) would be susceptible to both direct attack and the 
atmospheric effects associated with nuclear detonations.106 Airfields, necessarily being 
large, fixed, "soft" targets, would be most vulnerable to surprise missile attack. Absent 
the possibility of sufficient tactical warning, few (if any) nuclear delivery aircraft could 
be expected to escape destruction. 
Seng's argument that the dangers of C2 vulnerability and pre-delegation of 
launch authority are much less serious when states adopt countervalue doctrines has some 
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merit, but the deployment of mobile ballistic missiles is actually unlikely to buy much 
time for the victim of a first strike to perform "confirmations" and "careful analysis" 
before retaliating.  The officers in charge of the few missiles in the field that survived a 
first strike would in all likelihood find themselves completely cut off from higher 
authority for some time. Exactly how would they confirm that their inability to 
communicate with central authorities was due to an adversary's nuclear attack, and not 
equipment failures, atmospheric conditions, or a host of other possibilities? Redundant 
communications channels, radiation sensors, and the like would provide an increased 
level of confidence that an actual attack had taken place, but field commanders would 
undoubtedly feel some pressures to make a launch decision. In the event of an actual 
attack, the air force of the attacking nation would be searching for the defender's 
remaining mobile missiles, and its odds of finding and destroying them might be higher 
than the Gulf War analogy suggests. Missile commanders could not be sure that years of 
peacetime intelligence gathering had not revealed the locations of their operating areas or 
pre-surveyed  launch  sites,   and  would  have  to  consider the  possibility that  the 
electromagnetic effects of a few nuclear weapons dropped nearby might disable their 
missiles or the equipment needed to launch them. Even when relying on a countervalue 
nuclear doctrine, the officers in charge of mobile ballistic missiles would face the "use 
them or lose them" pressures that contribute to the danger of inadvertent war. 
India and Pakistan are unlikely to be able to reap the stability-enhancing 
rewards of mutual reliance on countervalue nuclear doctrines for a more fundamental 
reason: Pakistan has not adopted a pure countervalue doctrine because such a doctrine 
would fail to meet its strategic needs. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal serves in part as a means 
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of redressing the imbalance between India and Pakistan's conventional military forces. 
Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance against an Indian invasion, the guarantor of 
Pakistan's territorial integrity.107 To fulfill this counterforce role without generating crisis 
instability, Pakistan's weapons must be sufficiently invulnerable to a first strike as to still 
be usable against Indian army formations, the type of time-critical target that necessitates 
both survivable C2 structures and delivery systems capable of attacking mobile forces. In 
this light, the vulnerability of Pakistan's airfields to surprise missile attack would be 
particularly alarming, drastically increasing pressures for preemption in the event that 
war was believed to be imminent. As Harvey notes: 
Ballistic missiles are best suited for striking targets of known location. The 
remote reconnaissance, assessment, and retargeting capabilities of most 
regional states are not sufficient to permit effective ballistic missile attacks 
against mobile or emerging battlefield targets... Aircraft are better suited 
for striking such targets. Sophisticated sensor systems, or even visual 
sighting, coupled with the ability to linger near the battlefield (although at 
risk of being shot down), give pilots a better opportunity to locate and 
attack these targets.108 
While it would not be impossible for Pakistan to employ short-ranged missiles with 
nuclear warheads against battlefield targets, targeting would still require the use of 
aircraft, especially against the type of dispersed armored formations that the Indian army 
has been developing since the 1980s specifically for use in a nuclear environment.109 
However remote the prospect of a large-scale Indian military incursion 
into Pakistan seems, indications are that Pakistan's government takes this threat very 
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seriously. The efforts of the Indian army to develop tactics for fighting in a nuclear 
environment confirm that Indian generals have not discounted the possibility that their 
conventional forces might someday need to operate against a nuclear-armed Pakistan. 
Pakistani officials do not rule out an Indian attempt to preempt Pakistan's nuclear forces 
in the event of such a conflict.110 Analysts in Pakistan have little confidence in India's 
nuclear no-first-use declaration, and believe that India's draft nuclear doctrine provides 
evidence that conventional forces would be used in a nuclear counterforce role as well. *! * 
C.       SOUTH   ASIAN   FORCE   STRUCTURES   AND   PERCEPTIONS   OF 
IMMINENT WAR 
1. Compound Effects of Force Vulnerability 
The level of force vulnerability associated with emerging Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear force structures is made doubly significant to an assessment of the likelihood of 
inadvertent war by a second effect of vulnerability. Force vulnerabilities generate not 
only perceptions of value in striking first, but can contribute also to perceptions of 
imminent war, potentially fulfilling both of the necessary conditions for inadvertent 
conflict. 
The idea that perceptions of vulnerability can contribute to perceptions that war is 
inevitable has its roots in studies of the causes of the First World War, where interlocking 
mobilizations in the autumn of 1914 defeated the best efforts of diplomats to diffuse 
international tensions and avert conflict. According to Paul Bracken: 
No dictator single-handedly pushed Europe into war in 1914; indeed, the 
national leaders of the major countries did not even want a conflict. Some 
even searched for last-minute alternatives to war. But during the preceding 
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decade an institutionalized potential for catastrophe had been built on 
interlocking alerts and mobilizations that swamped the political process... 
It was a disaster waiting to happen.112 
The "interlocking alerts" that Bracken describes were not the product of the whims of 
political leaders or senior military officers, but rather by the vulnerabilities associated 
with the types of military forces that Europe's great powers fielded at the time - relying 
upon reserve manpower for much of their fighting strength, European armies where 
vulnerable to catastrophic defeat if caught partially mobilized by a fully mobilized foe. 
Military leaders were keenly aware of the time needed to recall reservists to active 
service, equip them, and transport them to the likely fronts of combat. The great irony is 
that the mobilization schedules and alert postures necessitated by the vulnerabilities of 
these military forces served to make war even more likely by tending to make the 
suspicions of decision makers as to the likelihood of war self-confirming. Mobilizations 
resulted in counter-mobilizations, alerts in counter-alerts, in exactly the pattern described 
in Jervis's model of crisis instability.113 The vulnerabilities generated by South Asian 
nuclear forces may create even stronger pressures for inadvertent war along these lines. 
2.        Dangers of Reliance on Warning 
The link between force vulnerability and perceptions of imminent war is formed 
by the early warning mechanisms developed to provide opportunities for preemption or 
rapid response by detecting impending attacks. Warning systems can contribute to 
misperceptions of imminent war in at least three ways: 
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1. Action taken to reduce force vulnerability following the receipt of warning 
information, such as enhancing the readiness of those forces, can appear 
threatening to an adversary, causing it to respond in a similar fashion and 
initiating a self-confirming spiral of misperceptions regarding the likelihood of 
war. 
2. The cycle just described may be uncontrollable even when decision makers are 
aware of this danger, because adversaries' complex warning systems may act or 
interact in ways that senior leaders do not anticipate. In particular, the "vertical 
integration" of warning systems and operational forces - the organizational 
coupling of warning systems to the forces they protect in order to reduce 
vulnerability to surprise - can contribute to routinized responses to warning 
indications that feed misperceptions and can be difficult to interrupt. When the 
nuclear organizations of both adversaries are constructed in such a fashion, their 
alert postures become tightly coupled, producing interactive outputs of the kind 
and at a rate that may defeat all attempts at control.114 
3. The data that warning systems collect for indications of imminent attack is 
itself subject to error, both because of imperfections in the way that warning 
information is gathered and due to errors in the way that such information is 
interpreted. 
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The potential for each of above factors is enhanced by changes in military technology 
that reduce the amount of time available for warning systems to perform their role. In the 
South Asian case, the availability of aircraft-delivered weapons alone limits warning time 
sufficiently to contribute to misperceptions of imminent war, and the addition of ballistic 
missiles to nuclear arsenals would make this danger worse. 
With respect to the potential for a cycle of misperceptions, an increase in the 
speed with which a crippling attack may materialize enhances the possibility for 
perceptions of inevitable war by reducing (or even eliminating) the opportunity for 
preventive diplomacy. When defensive response times are measured in minutes rather 
than hours or days, leaders may lose the chance to confer with one another to clarify 
misunderstandings and discuss measures to diffuse crises. In this way, the technologies of 
the nuclear age institutionalize the "potential for catastrophe" in this dynamic to an even 
greater extent than did the mass conscription and railroad timetables of a century ago. 
While acknowledging that the development of vulnerable nuclear forces by 
regional powers might create pressures for reinforcing alerts that could contribute to 
perceptions of imminent war, analysts have argued that the small nuclear arsenals of 
these states should be inherently less susceptible to routinized organizational outputs that 
help make such spirals difficult to control. Small nuclear forces, they assert, need rely 
upon less complex warning and C2 organizations than those constructed by the 
superpowers, minimizing the number of personnel involved in nuclear decision making, 
simplifying oversight by central leaders, and allowing for less reliance on potentially 
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dangerous standard operating procedures. In theory, both vertical integration and tight 
coupling should be less of a problem for regional powers.115 
While it is certainly reasonable to expect that the warning systems and nuclear 
forces of states like India and Pakistan will not attain the complexity of those of the 
United States and Soviet Union, even the. nuclear forces of these nations will be 
susceptible to the same pressures that drove the superpowers towards vertically integrated 
nuclear organizations and tightly coupled alert postures. Both Bracken's work and more 
recent research by Bruce Blair have shown that the coupling of warning systems to 
operational forces during the Cold War was the result of the need to protect vulnerable 
arsenals and command and control systems from surprise attack, and not merely the 
complexity of the superpowers' arsenals. Developments that reduced the amount of time 
available for alerting and directing nuclear forces - such as the Soviet Union's 
deployment of SLBMs off the U.S. coast in the late 1960s and improvements to NATO's 
theater nuclear forces during the 1980s - resulted in attention to improving warning 
systems  and  alert  procedures  in  a  manner  that  increased  their  complexity and 
interconnectedness, enhancing the potential for reactive alerting during crises.116 The 
minimal tactical warning time available to South Asian nuclear forces even in the 
absence of ballistic missile deployments will in all likelihood create similar pressures for 
the integration of warning systems and operational forces. If ballistic missiles are 
ultimately added to India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, this process is likely to go even 
115
 Seng, 73-78. 
116
 This theme runs throughout the work of both authors; the specific examples given are from Blair 
124-27 and Bracken 34-35. 
57 
farther, since (as discussed earlier in this chapter) their nuclear forces would become 
almost entirely dependent upon strategic warning for their survival.117 
The limited amount of time available to warning systems in South Asia would 
also magnify the impact of errors in the gathering and interpretation of information, 
further increasing the probability of misperceptions of imminent war. A loss of time in 
the decision making process induces stress, limits time for deliberation, and may force 
leaders and organizations to act on less information than would ordinarily be deemed 
necessary for a decision as momentous as the use of nuclear arms.118 Moreover, under 
such conditions the significance of "false alarms" that result from equipment failures, 
miscommunication, improper interpretation of data, and other sources is enhanced. Blair 
has shown that as the number of information gathering cycles that tactical warning 
systems can perform decreases, two distinct phenomena increase the probability of 
misperceptions of imminent or actual attack: greater weight is attached to initial 
expectations of the likelihood of war (which are generally based upon the less reliable 
outputs of strategic warning systems), and false alarms that are generated by the system 
are more likely to be evaluated as genuine (fewer information gathering cycles are 
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available to correct errors).119 When initial expectations as to the likelihood of war are 
sufficiently high, a single error may result in a "high confidence" assessment as to the 
probability of conflict. 
In summary, the levels of force vulnerability associated with South Asian nuclear 
arsenals, whether or not they include ballistic missile delivery systems, will have as 
negative an impact upon the possibility for misperceptions of imminent war as they will 
for perceptions of advantage in being the first to strike. As they would maximize the 
mutual vulnerability of India and Pakistan to preemptive attack and minimize the time 
available to warning systems, however, the introduction of ballistic missiles would 
represent the most dangerous possible force structure development, contributing most 
significantly to the potential for both of the conditions necessary for inadvertent war. 
D.        NET IMPACT OF EMERGING SOUTH ASIAN FORCE STRUCTURES 
UPON THE DANGER OF INADVERTENT WAR 
Given the limited numbers of nuclear weapons that India and Pakistan will 
possess during the next decade, perceptions of force vulnerability, and hence value in 
being the first to attack in the event of war, may be substantial even if both countries 
continue to rely only on aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons. In such an 
environment, pressures for preemption would exist in the form of both the opportunity for 
achieving damage limitation by striking first and in the need to protect nuclear forces 
from preemptive destruction. Pakistan's lack of geographic depth would tend make the 
former a more tempting option for India and the latter more significant concern for 
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Pakistan. These pressures would be offset somewhat by the fact that attacking aircraft 
could be shot down and tactical warning systems would provide some hope of force 
survival for the recipient of a first strike. 
Should India and Pakistan deploy ballistic missiles, however, the importance of 
being the first to attack in a nuclear exchange is likely to increase dramatically. Not only 
will the mobility from which missiles benefit do little to enhance the survivability of 
nuclear arsenals as a whole, but the utility of these weapons for conducting surprise 
attacks upon missiles in garrison, C2 systems, and airfields will provide additional 
incentives for preemptive strikes. Pakistan especially, with the strategic need to employ 
nuclear weapons as part of a warfighting strategy, will be hard pressed to refrain from 
preemption in the event that war seems imminent. 
The increase in vulnerability that would be associated with the operationalization 
of ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems would be made all the more dangerous by 
the compounding effect that increases in force vulnerability have with respect to 
perceptions of imminent war. The time stress that such weapons would place upon 
regional nuclear organizations would contribute to the importance of strategic warning 
systems in such a way as to encourage the development of vertically integrated force 
structures, with the alert posture of each adversary tightly coupled to the activities of the 
other. In this kind of environment, both the potential for misperception and the impact of 
specific misperceptions would be magnified, enhancing the potential for the second 
condition necessary for crisis instability and inadvertent conflict. 
How can the overall potential for inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia be 
characterized? Absent a quantitative scale against which the level of danger can be 
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judged, a qualitative assessment must suffice. It is clear from the analysis above that even 
in their present form, South Asian arsenals are sufficiently vulnerable to first strikes to 
generate the possibility of both sets of perceptions required for the initiation of 
inadvertent war during a crisis. For the time being, the potential for an unintended nuclear 
war between India and Pakistan can at least be called significant. Contrary to arguments 
made by some proliferation optimists, it is equally clear that the addition of ballistic 
missiles to South Asian nuclear arsenals, a process that may well already be in progress, 
would represent an unfavorable development for regional crisis stability. In the event that 
such weapons are deployed, the danger of an inadvertent nuclear catastrophe will be even 
greater. 
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IV.    CONCLUSIONS 
A.        CENTRAL FINDINGS 
The analysis conducted in the preceding chapters supports two main conclusions: 
1. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons is not sufficient to preclude the danger 
of inadvertent war between regional adversaries. South Asia is not distinctive in 
this regard. 
The first conclusion flows from the discussion of proliferation optimism, nuclear 
deterrence, and crisis instability theory conducted in Chapter 2. Even if one accepts a 
minimalist formulation of the requirements for deterrence - that fears of even a slight 
possibility of nuclear retribution should be sufficient to prevent the premeditated 
initiation of nuclear conflict - inadvertent nuclear war between nuclear-armed adversaries 
remains a possibility because of specific situational pressures that may come to exist 
under conditions of crisis instability. When an adversary's use of nuclear weapons is 
believed to be imminent and a significant advantage is perceived to accrue to the nation 
that strikes first, pressures for preemption may exist in the form of a desire to limit the 
damage caused by the adversary's attack and/or the need to employ one's own nuclear 
weapons before they are destroyed or otherwise rendered unusable. 
The potential for both of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war is strongly 
influenced by the force structures adopted by nuclear adversaries. The nuclear force 
structures adopted by such nations (and, to a degree, their conventional force structures as 
well) play a fundamental role in shaping perceptions of how vulnerable nuclear forces 
and their supporting infrastructures are to counterforce first strikes. Perceptions of 
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vulnerability, in turn, may contribute to both perceptions of first strike advantage and 
beliefs of the inevitability of war. 
2. There is already a significant potential for inadvertent nuclear war between 
India and Pakistan during the next decade. This potential will be increased if the 
two nations elect to operationalize ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems. 
There exists a significant potential for inadvertent war between India and Pakistan 
even if these nations elect not to incorporate ballistic missiles as a part of their nuclear 
arsenals. The combination of small nuclear arsenals, the operating characteristics of 
aircraft (especially their dependence upon fixed airfields), the geographic proximity of 
India and Pakistan, and Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons as a counter to the 
conventional superiority of India's army creates a significant potential for perceptions of 
vulnerability that could lead to inadvertent nuclear conflict in the event of crises. 
Although ballistic missiles possess some characteristics that might be expected to reduce 
the potential for perceptions of vulnerability to nuclear first strikes, the net impact of their 
introduction in the context of an Indo-Pakistani confrontation would be to increase first- 
strike vulnerability. Nuclear-armed ballistic missiles both exacerbate many of the first- 
strike vulnerabilities that exist in an "aircraft only" environment and create new potential 
for perceptions of first-strike advantage and beliefs of imminent war. 
B.        POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The threat of inadvertent war provides a strong supporting rationale for continued 
U.S. opposition to the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to South Asia. Yet while the 
elimination of these capabilities would certainly eliminate the danger of inadvertent 
nuclear conflict, such a goal is unlikely to provide the basis for an effective U.S. policy 
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toward the region. Whatever the complex motivations that led India and Pakistan to 
conduct nuclear tests in 1998, prospects for nuclear "unproliferation" in South Asia in the 
near term are not good.120 The Indian government insists that the security concerns that 
drive its nuclear weapons program extend beyond the subcontinent (most notably to its 
long-standing rivalry with China) and conditions India's commitment to the eventual 
elimination of nuclear weapons upon negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention 
that will apply globally.121 Meanwhile, so long as India possesses nuclear weapons, 
Pakistan is unlikely to renounce them either. Official U.S. policy pronouncements since 
the 1998 tests have done well to recognize these facts, maintaining an opposition to India 
and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons in principle, but acknowledging the realty 
of their security concerns and expressing a willingness to work to reduce nuclear dangers 
by less total means than the elimination of the weapons themselves.122 
Although an elimination of the danger of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia is 
unlikely in the near term, there may be much that the United States can do to help reduce 
the potential for perceptions of vulnerability that give rise to the necessary conditions for 
inadvertent conflict or to otherwise lessen the danger of unintended war. The following 
policy prescriptions offer some hope of limiting the threat of inadvertent nuclear war 
120
 The term "unproliferation," perhaps a less insulting term to Indians and Pakistanis than "rollback," 
is borrowed from Perkovich 455. 
121
 "India Not to Engage." 
122
 For two examples, see United States, Department of State, Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of 
State, "On-the-Record Briefing on India and Pakistan," 28 May 1998 Washington D.C., Washington D.C., 
12 Sep. 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_rernarks/1998/980528_talbott_nuclear.htrnl> and United 
States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "U.S.-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st 
Century," 21 Mar. 2000, Agra, India, 12 Sep. 2000 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/democracy/fs_000321_us_india.html>. 
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between India and Pakistan until a more lasting solution to their political and military 
rivalry can be found: 
1. Improve the balance of incentives and disincentives that encourage restraint 
with respect to the deployment of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 
As the procurement and operationalization of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles 
would significantly increase the potential for inadvertent war in South Asia, policies 
designed to encourage India and Pakistan to refrain from such activities are an 
imperative. The threat of punitive measures alone, however, is unlikely to influence 
South Asian decision-making decisively. The existence of disincentives such as the 
potential for economic sanctions can contribute to restraint, but target nations may choose 
to accept the costs such measures impose when issues of overriding national importance 
are believed to be at stake. Sanctions may even be counterproductive insofar as they tend 
to produce a "rally around the flag effect," especially likely in a region as sensitive to 
perceptions of foreign imperialism as South Asia.123 While the use of incentives to 
encourage ballistic missile restraint may seem to be only the reverse side of the sanctions 
coin - merely increasing what the United States can take away in the event of undesired 
behavior - the differences in perceptions associated with positive incentives may make 
them far better tools for promoting stabilizing decision-making. 
123
 Foran 48. For more detailed discussions of the relative merits of sanctions and incentives for 
achieving foreign policy goals see also Patrick Clawson, How has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 
Sanctions, 1990-1993, McNair Paper 22 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1993); Kimberly 
Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?," International Security 23.1 (Summer 
1998): 50-65; Aaron Karp, "Indian Ambitions and the Limits of American Influence," Arms Control Today, 
May 1998, 14 Aug. 2000 <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/may98/kpmy98.htm>; and Robert A. Pape, 
"Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22.2 (Fall 1997): 90-136 and "Why 
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Etel Solingen's research indicates that domestic pressures are as important as 
external constraints (such as security concerns or international treaty regimes) in 
determining the nuclear postures of regional powers. She notes that liberalizing 
coalitions, composed of domestic actors that "strive to maximize their gains from 
international economic exchange," tend to favor nuclear restraint, since a state's pursuit 
of nuclear capabilities often has negative repercussions for the access to the global 
economy upon which these groups depend.124 Liberalizing coalitions are typically 
opposed, however, by inward-looking constituencies that benefit from state-supported 
approaches to economic development. These inward-looking coalitions often adopt 
nationalist rhetoric to bolster the popular appeal of their support for the development of 
nuclear weapons capabilities.125 
Solingen's findings suggest that ongoing efforts to promote private economic 
contacts between India and the United States may be among the most effective methods 
of encouraging Indian restraint with respect to the deployment of nuclear-armed ballistic 
missiles.126 The economic growth that is likely to result from such contacts should 
enhance the voice of liberalizing coalitions in Indian politics and illustrate the positive 
consequences of ballistic missile forbearance. If economic cooperation can be extended 
to benefit the public sector of India's economy as well, domestic coalitions favoring 
124
 Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security 19.2 (Fall 
1994): 138. Solingen cites evidence from India and Pakistan specifically in support of her arguments. 
125
 Solingen 138-41. See pages 138 and 140 for descriptions of the typical members of each type of 
coalition. 
126
 In March of 2000, Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and U.S. President Bill Clinton announced 
a number of initiatives designed to promote Indo-U.S. economic cooperation, including the formation of a 
high-level economic Coordinating Group, a U.S.-India Financial and Economic Forum, a regularized U.S.- 
India Commercial Dialogue, a U.S.-India Working Group on Trade, and a U.S.-India Science and 
Technology Forum. See United States, Department of State, "U.S.-India Relations." 
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ballistic missile restraint may even expand to incorporate actors that previously opposed 
them.127 To the extent that Pakistan's stance on ballistic missile deployments is likely to 
be strongly influenced by that of India, success in these efforts may encourage ballistic 
missile restraint on the part of both nations.128 
2. Address security concerns that encourage the growth of South Asian nuclear 
capabilities. 
Whatever the actual role of security concerns in determining South Asian force 
structures and nuclear postures, efforts to discourage India and Pakistan from deploying 
ballistic missiles will have to take such concerns into account. If nothing else, security 
justifications allow for powerful "mythmaking" by domestic elites with an interest in the 
further development of nuclear capabilities.129 The methods that the United States has 
employed in other parts of the world to help alleviate such concerns are unlikely to be 
127
 Notable among the Indian public sector industries that could benefit from either private investment 
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effective in South Asia. Substantial sales of conventional arms sales to India and Pakistan 
are as likely to enhance perceptions of first strike vulnerability as they are to reduce them, 
and would probably contribute to general pressures for arms racing.130 Meanwhile, the 
United States lacks the political will needed to extend positive security guarantees to 
India and Pakistan, two countries that would have historical cause to doubt the credibility 
of such arrangements even if they were to be offered.131 Policymakers in India are also 
likely to see the acceptance of positive security guarantees as inappropriate for a state 
with an independent foreign policy and great power aspirations of its own. 
A stronger case can be made for the potential value of negative security 
assurances (nuclear no-first-use guarantees) in discouraging India and Pakistan from the 
construction of ballistic missile-equipped nuclear arsenals. It is a great irony that the 
Indian government, which places such great emphasis on the stabilizing effects of its own 
no-first-use pledge, has so little faith in the credibility of China's similar declaratory 
policy.132 If the credibility of China's no-first-use guarantee could be enhanced, the 
primary security rationale for India's construction of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles 
would be eliminated (missiles currently are seen as the only way of threatening retaliation 
in the event of a Chinese first strike), contributing to the likelihood of Indian restraint and 
corresponding restraint by Pakistan. 
130
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The United States thus far has been among the least willing of the five NWS to 
sign a legally binding no-first-use treaty, though China has repeatedly issued calls for the 
NWS to reach such an accord. A number of security analysts have argued that the current 
U.S. policy of "calculated ambiguity" with respect to the possibility of nuclear weapons 
use in response to biological, chemical, or conventional attack is both outmoded and 
dangerous. As the United States and its primary alliance partners in NATO possess an 
overwhelming superiority in conventional weaponry over virtually any potential 
adversary, it is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the use of nuclear weapons 
would be warranted other than in response to a nuclear attack. U.S. retention of a first-use 
option merely serves to underscore the importance of nuclear weapons in the eyes of 
would-be NWS, and may even create a "commitment trap," in which the United States 
could feel forced to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical attack in 
order to maintain its international credibility.133 Serious consideration should be given to 
abandoning this policy in favor of a legally binding and unambiguous commitment to no- 
first-use. 
Although India would presumably have to be excluded from no-first-use treaty 
negotiations between the NWS to preserve the distinctions of the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), the existence of a no-first-use treaty might encourage India to write its own 
pledge into national law. Such a move could render India's guarantee more credible in 
the eyes of Pakistan's leaders, and thus further reduce pressures for ballistic missile 
133
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Control Today, Mar. 1998, 14 Aug. 2000 <http://www.anmcontrol.org/ACT/marcli98/lettermr.litm>; Jack 
Mendelsohn, "NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No-First-Use.'" Arms Control Today Jul.- 
Aug. 1999. 14 Aug. 2000 <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/julaug99/jmja99.htm>.; and Scott D. Sagan, 
"The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and 
Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security 24.4 (Spring 2000): 85-115. 
70 
deployments in South Asia. In the event of a crisis, the existence of a binding no-first-use 
pledge could limit the potential for perceptions of inevitable nuclear war, reducing the 
likelihood inadvertent conflict even if nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are ultimately 
deployed in the region. 
3. Reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international politics. 
Besides signing a no-first-use treaty, there is much that the United States and the 
other NWS could do to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs, 
minimizing the prestige attached to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and advanced 
delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, and thereby further reducing pressures for 
arms racing in South Asia. Of all the NWS, the United States is technologically 
positioned to suffer the least from ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), a move that would contribute strongly to this goal. An even clearer signal could 
be sent to India and Pakistan by renewed U.S. support for an expansion of the permanent 
membership of the United Nations Security Council through the addition of several non- 
NWS in good standing. The admission of states such as Brazil, Germany, and Japan 
would be of particular value by virtue of their obvious technological capabilities but 
demonstrated restraint in nuclear matters. The significance of this step would be 
especially apparent to India, which desires a Security Council seat of its own, and would 
provide a powerful incentive for nuclear restraint and even unproliferation in the long 
term. 
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4. Act to defuse emergent Indo-Pakistani crises in a manner that both reduces the 
danger of inadvertent conflict and discourages the initiation of further 
confrontations. 
The United States can act to reduce the threat of inadvertent war in South Asia 
without compromising its claim to impartiality in Indo-Pakistani disputes or encouraging 
nuclear confrontation as a means for either nation to advance its foreign policy goals. The 
current U.S. position on Kashmir, which states that the United States will only offer its 
services as mediator if requested by both parties, helpfully serves to blunt hopes in 
Pakistan that repeated crises will provoke international intervention that might strengthen 
Pakistan's bargaining position.134 The United States must do more to encourage India to 
participate in useful bilateral negotiations with its neighbor to avoid giving Pakistanis the 
impression that military avenues offer the only paths to a resolution of the Kashmir 
question. 
In the event of actual military confrontations between India and Pakistan, the 
United States can play a highly constructive role without taking sides on the merits of 
their disputes. U.S. diplomacy can serve to make the military activities of each side more 
transparent and less threatening in appearance, and may enable regional leaders to de- 
escalate crises in a face-saving manner.135 When the activities of one nation clearly 
134
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precipitate a confrontation, as did Pakistan's infiltration of insurgents across the LOC 
near Kargil in 1999, a clear identification of the responsible party by U.S. officials can 
reduce pressures in the other nation for escalation.136 
C.       THE STAKES FOR SOUTH ASIA AND THE WORLD 
The threat of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia is unlikely to disappear in the 
near future, however energetic U.S. or multilateral initiatives aimed at reducing this 
danger may be. As new nuclear capabilities become available to India and Pakistan, 
further research will be required to assess the impact of such developments upon the 
potential for inadvertent conflict in the region.137 Additional studies are also needed to 
determine whether the NWS can offer technical assistance to reduce dangers of nuclear 
weapons accidents or unauthorized use without encouraging the deployment of 
destabilizing weapons systems. 
The very real danger of inadvertent conflict between India and Pakistan highlights 
the need for redoubled efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities to other parts 
of the world. While the balance of incentives and disincentives that work to support the 
global nonproliferation regime have failed to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia, 
the fact that an overwhelming proportion of the world's nations remain signatories to the 
NPT is testimony to the continued appeal of nonproliferation norms. Maintaining the 
Deterrence" 87-91. 
13° Bajpai, Kanti, "Testing the Limits: Indian Restraint vs Pak Brinksmanship," Times of India 6 July 
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resiliency of these norms will entail real costs and risks for the NWS, requiring these 
states to move away from the reliance on nuclear weapons that seems increasingly 
hypocritical to those nations that have forsworn them. The evidence presented here 
suggests that these costs and risks are worth bearing. The alternative is a world in which 
the danger of inadvertent nuclear war threatens millions who need not yet fear it. 
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